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The 20th of July, he considers as an act of desperation on the part of patriotically (vaterlaendisch) minded, wise, and important men, whose fate he genuinely regretted. His congratulatory telegram to the Fuehrer he claims to have sent only "to maintain peace and order among the troops". The 45 officers he is alleged to have shot in connection with this event, he labels a propaganda story of the English radio, of which not a word is true.

Difficulties with the SS: Of the SS division "Prinz Eugen", which was under his command, v.W. says that with these troops he had many difficulties. He had not the right to undertake transfers to relieve anyone of his command. He was only permitted to submit a report to the SS-Reichsfuehrer. His experience was, however, he states, that these reports did little good, and consequently he only utilized this right once or twice. On the basis of atrocities and murders committed by SS men against Croats, he demanded the transfer and punishment of a regimental commander. The Commander was removed from his post, only to soon afterwards, occupy another equally important post.

Reports concerning foreign radio broadcasts were regularly brought to him, but he credited them with no great degree of truth. He himself, he states, was twice reported as being murdered, and such stories had naturally had a detrimental effect on the credibility of the source.

Hans Wallenberg
HANS WALLENBERG
CAPT PWB-CPT

Ernst Langendorf
ERNST LANGENDORF
PWB CPT

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12 Oct 45

ANNEX A--PARTISAN WARFARE

a. PREREQUISITES FOR PARTISAN WAR

(1) Terrain

"Partisan warfare in the Balkans was favored by the rugged, often hardly accessible mountain territory, which provided convenient hideouts for guerilla fighters. The lack of railroads, roads, and paths in this region also proved to be of advantage--for when roads were blocked, detours were not readily available. Thanks to the country's poor system of communications, occupation forces found it very difficult to establish control. While large guerilla units of division or corps size assembled at various centers, smaller units were at all times distributed throughout the country."

(2) Fighters

"In contrast to the disorganized fighting in Greece, warfare in Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia was directed by one man's leadership--by TITO. This can be considered a perfect example of effective partisan warfare. Distinction could be made between various kinds of activities, ranging from small squads to the operations of large battle groups with missions to carry out a planned occupation. TITO increased his forces as time went on, starting on a small scale with a group of dissatisfied Croats, and ending with forced conscription. Thus he succeeded in gradually building up his guerilla bands into well equipped and well trained divs and corps, which were later grouped into armies."

"Their fighting quality and their equipment were vastly superior to those of our auxiliary Croatian and Bulgarian troops. This was made possible through large air and seaborne shipments of British weapons, food, and equipment and the subsequent help of British officers. TITO also benefitted through reinforcements of British trained Yugo. brigades, sent from Italy. His combat strength toward the end of the war was said to comprise 35 divs."

(3) Six Rules for Guerilla War--TITO

"TITO based his operations on these principles:

- i. Supply centers established in well secured, inconspicuous places, providing bases for all kinds of missions.
- ii. Air fields suited for the landing of supply planes as well as for intermediate stops of British reconnaissance and fighter planes.
- iii. Well marked dropping zones for aerial supply. Pre-arrange light signals, changing frequently.
- iv. An extensive communications system, enabling the commander in chief to maintain complete control over all his units. (German monitors found that TITO's communications functioned very smoothly.)
- v. Extensive scouting activities to determine enemy movements and supply traffic. TITO profited greatly by cooperation from the population in this matter.
- vi. Training camps located at inconspicuous places, with special emphasis on the schooling of specialists."

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b. GUERRILLA TACTICS

(1) Small Units

"Guerilla warfare in Greece suffered from a lack of uniform leadership. Nevertheless there were times when it caused serious disturbances among rear area communications. The explosion of a railroad bridge on the SALONIKI-ATHENS line, for example, interrupted traffic for about two weeks. During that time troop movements and supply were limited to truck transportation. When it became necessary to withdraw a large portion of the German occupation troops from the Greek peninsula, ELAS fighters gained control over most of this area, with exception of the main roads. A few narrow-gauge railroads could also be kept operating.

"Whenever an attempt was made to fight the Greek partisans, they would temporarily become peaceful peasants, and take up their arms only after the departure of German troops.

"The chief aim of guerilla warfare was the destruction of supply lines. This led to the demolition of railroad tracks and roads, to attacks on supply columns, trains, small strong points, and local occupation forces. RAF fighter-bombers cooperated with the partisans by patrolling supply lines in daytime, so that they would have to be used at night, and thus be more vulnerable to attack. These disturbances centered around the railroad line ZAGREB-BELGRADE-NISCH-SKOPLJE. Repeated destruction of bridges in Macedonia led to prolonged interruption of traffic. The tracks between ZAGREB and BROD were targets for many attacks. During the later phase of operations attacks took place every night--damaging as many as 14 different points along the tracks at one time. This damage could be repaired in a very short time, however. On the other hand, destruction of bridges along the BROD-SARAJEVO road frequently disrupted railroad traffic for long periods.

"The important road between BIHAR and KNIN was threatened constantly. Other dangerous roads led from ZAGREB to VARAZDIN and from ZAGREB to BELGRADE. Travellers on these routes had to be given special protection at all times. Disturbances increased whenever important German operations were expected."

(2) Large Groups

"Large scale partisan operations employed several divs, whose strength varied from a few hundred to 4,000 men. Their object was to occupy politically and economically important locations, or to procure supplies in great quantities. One town which had been taken by the partisans could be retaken only after a planned encirclement by German troops. Partisan attacks were begun from several directions at one time, using the element of surprise wherever possible.

"As long as TITO's forces were not equipped with modern arms they had little chance of defeating regular soldiers in a pitched battle. Therefore they tried to withdraw when approached by strong bodies of regular troops. They were very clever at this maneuver. They would split up into small groups, quietly slip away, and reassemble at another place.

"Later on the partisans were equipped with modern weapons, with arty pieces, motor vehicles, and even tanks. This equipment was first captured from the Italians, and later supplied by Great Britain. This mechanization forced them to stay close to roads.

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"Partisan operations were well coordinated with RAF planes who provided fighters and fighter-bombers for air support. Toward the end of the war, TITO's operations became so well organized, and were carried out on so large a scale, that they cannot be considered as partisan engagements in the real sense of the word anymore. An example of this was his attack on BOSNIA, starting in Southern Serbia and Montenegro."

c. GERMAN COUNTER MEASURES

(1) Groups Aiding Germany

"German troops in the EPIRUS region depended for their supplies on a road between IARISSA and JANINA, which passed through the PINDUS mountains. This road was seriously threatened by ELAS troops, until Gen ZERVAS began to assemble his men in that region. ZERVAS' actions were sometimes neutral toward us, and sometimes hostile. He prevented actual conflict with Germany for a long time through negotiations. This provided a considerable relief of the threats against our supply road."

"MIHAILOVIC's troops once fought against our occupation troops out of loyalty to their King. At the same time they fought against TITO, because of anti-Communist convictions. This two front war could not last long, particularly when British support favored TITO. Consequently MIHAILOVIC showed pro-German leanings. There were engagements during which Serbian Chetniks fought TITO alongside German troops. On the other hand, hostile Chetnik groups were known to attack German supply trains in order to replenish their own stocks."

"MIHAILOVIC liked to remain in the background, and leave such affairs up to his subordinates. He hoped to bide his time with this play of power until an Anglo-American landing would provide sufficient support against TITO. Germany welcomed his support, however temporary. Chetnik reconnaissance activities were valued highly by our commanders. Only when Serbia was threatened by a Russian breakthrough from Bulgaria, did TITO's forces succeed in making a strong penetration into the threatened country. MIHAILOVIC could not resist this thrust, and withdrew into Croatia."

(2) Purpose and Method of German Counter Attacks

"The aims of our counter attacks were limited to the destruction of particularly dangerous partisan groups, the seizure or demolition of their supply depots, and occasional assaults of their hq. It was important to have advance knowledge of partisan plans, in order to forestall them by counter attacks. They proved to be most vulnerable while assembling, and while on the march. Attacks on their hideouts involved greater risks to our troops, and also gave the partisans a better chance of escape."

"Our attacks were executed from several directions in an attempt to catch the enemy in a complete net. The partisans liked to avoid frontal attacks, preferring retreat into inaccessible mountain regions. Thus it was only possible for us to inflict heavy casualties--complete annihilation could not be accomplished. The partisans lost large quantities of heavy equipment during their retreats, however. -- Rather than fight the enemy in the mountains, it was advantageous to keep up an uninterrupted attack upon completion of the encirclement. By outrunning the partisans with motorized vehicles, cutting off their retreat, and thus separating them from supply centers, we were able to achieve satisfactory results. It was determined by monitored radio messages that heavy casualties, supply difficulties, and problems of

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evacuating the wounded seriously hampered the enemy, and made him comparatively harmless for long periods afterwards."

(3) German Intelligence Service in the Balkans

"A well organized intelligence service was required to keep ahead of partisan plans. This consisted of personnel familiar with the country and the language. Dependable natives were employed as often as possible. Radio messages were monitored. We succeeded almost always in obtaining a complete picture of the disposition and plans of partisan units. We likewise received information concerning their condition and casualties."

(4) Major Operations of the Balkan Partisan War

"During the last year of the war, TITO planned a major operation proceeding from Bosnia and Montenegro across the DRINA River, to occupy Southern Serbia. Two and one-half German divs were used in an envelopment movement, intended to stall this drive. TITO's army was able to break through our lines, however, even though our outposts were never more than 300 yards apart. On the other hand we were able to annihilate two of his divs by continuous pursuit."

"As late as winter of 1944-45 a Partisan group in the PAPUK mountains was annihilated by comparatively small German forces, mainly because they were denied access to large portions of their supplies. This enterprise could not be carried out to its ultimate conclusion, because some of our troops had to be committed at another place. Time was a most important element for the successful execution of such missions. But in view of the limited number of troops at our disposal we could not always spend as long on a mission as it would normally require."

"In addition to large counter attacks, it was necessary to interfere with partisan guerillas through small scale actions. Special bns formed for this purpose had received thorough training in guerilla warfare. They had an independent intelligence service within their respective areas. Wherever possible they were committed only in small units: assault groups and combat teams. They were supposed to create disturbances by attacking enemy strong points and supply depots. The occasional employment of airborne troops proved successful along this line. In May 44 we succeeded in assaulting TITO's hq, located near JAJCE, in an operation conducted by both airborne and ground forces. TITO was able to escape only because his bodyguard sacrificed his life to cover the leader's retreat. Numerous documents were captured by the attacking soldiers."

(5) Effect of Anti-Partisan Warfare

"Although our counter operations failed to clear the Balkans completely from undesirable opposition, we nevertheless achieved some good. Communication lines were maintained to such an extent, that no serious shortage of supplies occurred in spite of frequent interruptions. We furthermore succeeded in policing all areas required for the housing and movement of our troops, as well as for the economic exploitation of the country."

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ANNEX B--CRITICISMS OF BRITISH BALKAN STRATEGIES IN WORLD WAR II

a. GERMANY BENEFITED FROM YUGOSLAV CONFLICTS

"According to the German point of view, England committed a military and diplomatic mistake, when she systematically created military conflicts in Yugoslavia through encouragement and support of the revolutionary party (PUTSCHISTS). The long German-Yugoslav border, Hungary's doubtful political loyalties, Bulgaria's need for protection, Greece's hostile attitude, and the possibility of an Allied landing at SALONIKI--all these would have presented a much less pleasant and more enduring threat to the southeastern parts of Greater Germany and Italy than this temporary solution.

"There can be no doubt that the support of Greece by a few British divs, committed at a moment's notice, was a strategic error. It caused severe losses of men to the New Zealand forces, not to mention prestige. It gave Germany and Italy a chance to move the whole Balkan front up to the coast, and to incorporate the advance sector of the Aegean Sea into our defense system.

"In spite of the enormous length of this coastal front, it required considerably fewer troops for defense than an ordinary front of equal length. A few first rate divs were sufficient to man the permanent coastal fortifications and positions, thanks to the better range of observation across the sea.

"Total occupation of the Balkans, resulting from the war with Yugoslavia also permitted a considerable influence on the British dominated Mediterranean Sea. Contributing factors were: a far-reaching supremacy in the Adriatic Sea up to Italy's fall, a changing domination in the Aegean, an occasional influence on the eastern Mediterranean. For some time it was even possible to supply German troops at EL ALAMEIN via CRETE.

"Even admitting German intentions to attack Greece in spring of 1941 through Bulgaria with the purpose of supporting Italy's Albanian front, the fact remains that Yugoslavia's entry into the war was to the Reich's advantage. The transformation of Macedonia into a theater of operations greatly facilitated a German attack on Greece by widening the front and enabling us to contact Italian units. The modern and well constructed Metaxas Line along the very short northern Greek border would have been a far more difficult obstacle than it turned out to be, had it not been for a simultaneous attack from Macedonia."

b. BRITISH MEDITERRANEAN SUPREMACY ENDANGERED

"The passage through the Mediterranean Sea and its control will always remain a vital question for England and her colonial Empire. For that reason England is greatly interested in the passage through the Dardanelles and in the grouping of great powers along the shores of this sea. Up to World War II, the most influential nations with access to the shores were France and Italy, representing a desirable balance of power. Now a new world power, Russia, has advanced to the important Mediterranean by way of two previously independent countries--Bulgaria and Thrace--and also toward the long Dalmatian coast through TITO's independent state. England has merely stood by so far, silently watching the effect of her own political errors. Although she preserved her sphere of interest in the greatest part of Greece and Albania at the TEHRAN Conference, this can be regarded only as a

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minor success in consideration of the events in Thrace after the German evacuation of the Southern Balkans.

"After the formal evacuation of the regular Bulgarian occupation forces, the same troops were reorganized with the Commissar system by the Soviets, and returned to Thrace. They then overpowered National Greek units, which had been organized by England, and forced them out of the country. Thus Russia forced her way to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas by the mere formality of a short detour through Communist Bulgaria, realizing her old ambition to possess the Dardanelles in a very inconspicuous manner. A new British separation of the Aegean Sea from the Mediterranean through the island chain surrounding CRETE could only prove effective in time of war. There is no possibility, however, of preventing Russian economic competition in ordinary times.

"The second approach to the Mediterranean through TITO's state, giving access to numerous harbors along the Dalmatian coast, fell into Russian hands very easily. No matter how the formal relation between the Soviet Union and the TITO state may appear on the surface, their political relations and intimate friendship will inevitably pave Russia's way for a powerful position in the Adriatic, which may easily lead to the end of British Mediterranean supremacy."

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
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PRISONER: Dr NEUBACHER, Herman

DATE: 29 Jan 46

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b. NEUBACHER's Relations with Axis Intelligence Agencies

(1) General

Judging with the limited amount of certainty that can be assumed in any CI interrogation, it appears that NEUBACHER knows very little of German intelligence activities, organization, and personnel. The little positive information which he has is based on his casual and rather informal association with men of the GIS and from experiences in cases where his own and GIS activities overlapped.

NEUBACHER asserts that prior to his appointment as plenipotentiary for SE Europe, he never had any contact with GIS agencies, nor, to the best of his knowledge, did any of his subordinates in BUCHAREST have such contacts. After his appointment as plenipotentiary, he derived his information from the following sources:

- (a) The intelligence officer (Ic) of O/Lef Sued-Ost
- (b) NEUBACHER's own intelligence teams (Obst von KUCHUTEX, Obst/Lt von LASSEE)
- (c) C/Fuehrer SCHAEFER, SPS BELGRADE
- (d) RSHA Sued-Ost Nachrichten Stelle, WIEN
- (e) Prime Minister MEDIC and his office
- (f) Draja MIHAILOVICH's HQ
- (g) Various local sources

Sources (a) - (c) were sanctioned by the Auswaertige Amt, but the connection with the RSHA office in WIEN, which NEUBACHER owed to his personal friendship with KALTENBRUNNER, was quite unofficial.

(2) RSHA

NEUBACHER's associations with KALTENBRUNNER were on a personal basis. Both men came from Upper Austria and shared the same political outlook. NEUBACHER was interested in KALTENBRUNNER's political activities, but did not concern himself with the latter's functions as chief of the RSHA.

By the same token, NEUBACHER claims to know very little of the composition and activities of Section VI-E, BERLIN, but was in close contact with the VI-E office in WIEN and twice met its chief, WANECK, after he had been recommended to him by KALTENBRUNNER. Of SCHELMENBERG he knew nothing beyond the fact that he was chief of Amt VI. His contacts with MUELLER were limited to one occasion, when he visited him (Aug 1944) on HITLER's orders in connection with the NEUBAUSER case (see c (17)). He professes to know nothing of Amt III.

In most cases NEUBACHER cannot give the exact titles or functions of RSHA personalities. He considered himself, as an international diplomat, above the need of having to pay attention to titles and offices of purely internal German interest.

NEUBACHER emphatically denies ever having submitted reports to any agency but the Foreign Office, and states that his position as a diplomat would never have permitted him to submit reports to intelligence agencies. In the early days, when he was friendly with von RIBBENTROP, NEUBACHER would have considered such action disloyal. Later, when his relations with the Foreign Minister had worsened, he was too careful to play such a trump into the hands of his foe.

NEUBACHER did, however, discuss matters of high level intelligence with KALTENBRUNNER and other leading GIS functionaries. By analyzing important current news he tried to influence WANECK's men to phrase their reports along lines corresponding with his own (see b. (7)).

While he made no attempt to interfere with KALTENBRUNNER's handling of matters of purely intelligence interest, he admits having influenced the RSHA chief in questions of politics. He believed that German diplomacy in the Balkans should have been based on cooperation with the Serbs, rather than with Bulgaria and the Ustaschas. NEUBACHER believes that his pro-Serbian attitude may have caused the impression that he had insisted on increased GIS activities in Serbia (cf CIR No 3, annex IV).

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(4) Relations between the Auswaertige Amt and RSHA

There was continuous rivalry and deep-seated hatred between RIBBENTROP and HIMMLER which projected itself over their respective departments and prevented any real collaboration. RIBBENTROP's ambition to have his reports reach HITLER ahead of HIMMLER's reports, at any price resulted in a reckless competition between officials of both departments who were as subservient to their chiefs as only officials of the Third Reich could be.

(5) RIBBENTROP's Special Secret Service

During an investigation by the German commissioner of the Serbian National Bank early in 1944, it was discovered that the leader of the Serbian peasants' cooperative possessed dollar notes, which was in violation of existing currency legislation. Shortly afterwards, Geheim Rat JUNGER, of NEURACHER's staff, accidentally discovered dollar notes in a top secret letter from the Auswaertige Amt, sent by diplomatic courier to this Serb.

NEURACHER was interested in this connection with the Auswaertige Amt because the matter had completely by-passed him. Upon closer investigation he found that the Serbian peasant leader was employed by a special Foreign Office branch which operated independently and without knowledge of the official German representatives in many countries. This secret service seemed to be supervised by Unter Staatssekretar HENKE, chief of the Politische Abteilung, who was directly under RIBBENTROP. The Serb also seemed to be the source of the periodic and rather poor intelligence reports on Serbia which NEURACHER received from the Auswaertige Amt. The secret service branch, in NEURACHER's opinion, was inefficient and inexperienced which leads him to conclude that it had been organized only a very short time.

Neither the agent for Serbia, nor any of the other agents of the special intelligence branch had any connection with the RSHA. NEURACHER is convinced that the special branch was organized by RIBBENTROP only because of his rivalry with the RSHA in the field of intelligence, and that his new organization was set up to compete with operations of Amt VI.

NEURACHER does not remember the names of anyone connected with this particular branch, except that of Unter Staatssekretar HENKE.

(6) IG Farben Intelligence Service

Although NEURACHER claims to remember very little of the activities and organization of the IG Farben Intelligence Service, it is believed that interrogation at some later date should reveal additional pertinent information.

The IG Farben Intelligence Service was divided into two main branches which seemed to operate independently.

Security service for all factories of the concern (Abwehrdienst gegen Werk Spionage) was directed by a section (name unknown) of the financial branch at the head office, BERLIN. NEURACHER remembers only two instances of work done by that branch, at the Louisa and at the Agfa works. There, X-ray devices were placed at spots which all visitors, even social callers, had to pass, and all hidden photographic films were ruined by the X-rays without knowledge of the people concerned.

Operational intelligence was the task of the Volks Wirtschaftliche (economic) Abteilung of IG main offices, BERLIN. Information was supplied by a large staff of highly-trained traveling agents and was evaluated by specialists of the economic branch. All other available sources were also used, and NEURACHER recalls an instance in which a highly desirable piece of information concerning the Imperial Chemical Industries concern was gathered by thorough study of a sports report published by the recreation branch of the trust. The economic department kept extensive files and records which should be of the highest intelligence interest.

The intelligence summaries of the operational branch were the best in Germany, if not in the entire world, and were often used by the Auswaertige Amt. NEURACHER saw some of these reports.

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(7) Ant VI

Late in Autumn 1943 KALTENBRUNNER offered NEULACHER the services of Ant VI in obtaining information on SE Europe. Such an alliance would have been very much against RIBBENTROP's wishes, but NEULACHER decided to disregard his chief's personal wishes and the order which forbade any agency of the Auswaertige Amt to contact any other organization without previously obtaining permission. He knew very well that KALTENBRUNNER and his men also were interested in keeping such an association secret. Acceptance of KALTENBRUNNER's offer was prompted by two considerations.

(a) Under the rules of the Auswaertige Amt NEULACHER was not supposed to collect information concerning countries outside his sphere of interest.

(b) Through contact with the appropriate offices of RSHA he could influence intelligence reports to highest headquarters insofar as they concerned his own sphere of operations and could thereby indirectly guide RSHA policies in such a way that they did not counteract his own.

NEULACHER states with considerable pride that he was the only official of the Auswaertige Amt who enjoyed the respect of the leaders of a rival organization. The further he drifted from RIBBENTROP's favor, the closer he became allied with KALTENBRUNNER, who placed all his services at NEULACHER's disposal. The RSHA chief even authorized him to give orders to men of Ant VI whenever their activities overlapped with those of the Plenipotentiary for SE Europe. NEULACHER succeeded in having Graf HEYSSNER, HSSPf Serbian, who did not cooperate in his pro-Serbian policy, removed and replaced by the more cooperative Graf DEHNENDS, CC of a Waffen SS command in Croatia and a former functionary of the Volksgemeinschaft, CC of a Stelle, BERLIN.

Nachrichten Stelle WIEN, an office of Gruppe VI-E, submitted its reports to NEULACHER through its Serbian branch and later one, after NEULACHER had moved to WIEN through a special liaison officer from Ant VI-E (Not CSD, of CIR no 3, ANNEX IX). This position was held by E/Stuf Dr WUEHRER, an Austrian (arrested by US authorities at Bad Gastein), who had his desk in NEULACHER's office. Through a lengthy discussion of all items of current interest with WUEHRER, NEULACHER succeeded in influencing WANECK to make his reports conform to his own policy. On the other hand, it was obvious to NEULACHER that all his utterances were exploited by WANECK's office.

NEULACHER thinks that KALTENBRUNNER enjoined WANECK from publishing any report which might encroach on the preserve of the Plenipotentiary for SE Europe without prior discussion with NEULACHER. While the office was still in BELGRADE, a certain REISEN, an Austrian stationed at WANECK's Serbian branch office, would frequently call on NEULACHER, ostensibly to submit reports from his office, but in reality to discuss current problems going far beyond that office's limited sphere of operations (Croatia and Serbia).

This practice may have led to the two wrong conclusions first that NEULACHER supervised all intelligence agencies in Serbia and Croatia, and second that he was the author of the most reliable intelligence reports on Serbia and Croatia which were read by WANECK and ROETTL (cf CIR No 3, ANNEX IV). NEULACHER states that he never wrote any intelligence reports and that he had no supervisory powers over any intelligence agencies.

In checking at random his knowledge of personalities listed in ANNEX IV, CIR No 3, only two names seemed to have any meaning to NEULACHER. He stated that Stuf HEYDE, listed among these personalities, organized (late 1943) IMRO Bulgarian terrorists in Northern Greece into a potential anti-communist force. NEULACHER remembered this particular instance because it was the only occasion when KALTENBRUNNER's policies ran counter to his own. HEYDE, according to NEULACHER, remained in Northern Greece until late Autumn 1944. The other personality known to NEULACHER was O/Stuf HELM whom he met once (November 1944) when the latter was police attache in ZAGREB.

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(8) Ic, Ober Befehlshaber Sud-Ost

Intelligence reports concerning military and guerilla activities came to NEULACHER from Obst/Lt von HARLING, the intelligence officer (Ic) of Ober Befehlshaber Sud-Ost. The reports came through channels, via Lt RITTER the liaison officer of the Auswaertige Amt (Verbindungs Officer - VAA) at the office of Ober Befehlshaber Sud-Ost. Lt RITTER was in peace-time an official of the Auswaertige Amt. (VAA's were attached to many staffs at Army, echelons or higher.) These reports were seldom delivered by von HARLING personally. On the other hand, NEULACHER and von HARLING met weekly at political conferences (so-called clearing conferences) under the chairmanship of von WEIGES.

(9) NEULACHER's Intelligence Team

Obst von KOHOUTEK and Obst/Lt von LASSER, two former officers of the Imperial Austrian Army, reliable and conscientious workers with a thorough knowledge of the Balkans were introduced to NEULACHER by STABERKER (of para 5(13)) shortly after his arrival in BELGRADE. There is some question as to from which office they had been sent. NEULACHER thinks that they came from von HARLING Ic of O/Bef Sud-Ost, and that they were connected with the Abwehr, because they were to be transferred from Serbia when the Abwehr was reorganized in Autumn 1943. NEULACHER protested to Admiral CANALES and succeeded in having the transfer cancelled. He does not know what the official status of the two men was after they were placed at his full disposal. NEULACHER retained Obst von KOHOUTEK in BELGRADE, where the latter had an office and a rather large staff at a location unknown to NEULACHER. Obst/Lt von LASSER was sent to ZAGREB on NEULACHER's orders. Aside from the fact that von LASSER employed a secretary at ZAGREB, NEULACHER knew no details regarding that office. Neither the officers nor their staffs appeared on the official table of organization or on the budget. Von KOHOUTEK received approximately 50,000 dinars monthly for expenses, and NEULACHER remembers that STABERKER advance von LASSER, on one or two occasions on NEULACHER's behalf certain sums in gold sovereigns for travelling expenses. Both officers, and sometimes members of their staffs, made extensive trips around the country. These trips were ordered by NEULACHER, but he does not know who signed the official travelling orders. NEULACHER's statements in this matter seem reliable, because he consistently declined to occupy himself with petty administrative matters which he considered unimportant in comparison with his activities at international diplomatic level.

Von KOHOUTEK was a specialist in matters concerning Macedonia and Albania, and, to a much lesser degree, Serbia. NEULACHER sent him on several important missions, including a trip into the TETOVCI-NICEVO-STUGA Lake OCHRID area where the causes of constant Bulgarian and Albanian complaints had to be investigated. Bulgaria sent her notes through the legation and the Auswaertige Amt Channels, while Albania filed her complaints directly with the plenipotentiary at BELGRADE. Another important mission of von KOHOUTEK resulted in the settlement of conflicts between Greeks and the Albanian minority in TSHANURIA (Province of Thessprotia, Greece). Von KOHOUTEK was in NEULACHER's service until the German retreat from BELGRADE (November 1944.)

Croatia was not within the official scope of interests of the Plenipotentiary for SE Europe, and NEULACHER owed much of the valuable information on this country to Obst/Lt von LASSER, who was a specialist on Croatia. Von LASSER's principal mission was to report on Moslem problems and to support a positive Moslem policy, following the pattern of the old Austro-Hungarian imperial policy.

NEULACHER lost not his two aides in WIEN, von LASSER around Christmas 1944, and von KOHOUTEK in March 1945.

(10) Chief of Sipo, BELGRADE

O/Fuehrer Dr SCHAEFER, SdS BELGRADE, submitted officially to NEULACHER his police reports which usually dealt with political or guerilla activities in Serbia. The reports generally were rather poor in quality and contained little useful information. NEULACHER did not put much stock in them, nor did he very often ask SCHAEFER to report to him personally.

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(11) Intelligence Supplied by the NEDIC Government

NEDIC personally supplied information, both orally and in the form of written reports. The information dealt primarily with Serbian, Bulgarian, and Croatian questions and, in NEUBACHER's opinion, leaned in favor of the Serbs. More information was obtained by members of NEUBACHER's staff through relations with the corresponding agencies of the NEDIC government. Among the latter sources, NEUBACHER mentioned Drago JOVANOVIC, a typical gangster, but an outstanding expert on communist matters, whose contributions proved valuable. JOVANOVIC, a Serb, had lost his position as chief of the Serbian police with the fall of MEYSSNER, but was retained by NEUBACHER as Mayor and Chief of Police of BELGRADE and proved himself a useful collaborator.

(12) Draža MIHAILOVICH

Minister JOVANOVIC, a professional criminologist, former chief of the BELGRADE police and one-time Minister of the Interior, served as MIHAILOVICH's liaison agent to NEUBACHER and supplied information which was of great value in the field of political activities. JOVANOVIC had a natural talent for politics, and NEUBACHER describes him as a "perfect worker". NEUBACHER did not maintain full-time liaison with MIHAILOVICH's headquarters, but sent Rudi STAERKER there on occasional missions.

(13) STAERKER

While NEUBACHER was an attache in BUCHAREST, he met Rudi STAERKER who at that time (Winter 1941-1942) was manager of Elatuork (Hollonisch-Tuerkische Handels Gesellschaft). This corporation was created in order to supply Greece with food and other commodities from foreign countries, primarily Turkey.

After NEUBACHER assumed his post as special Plenipotentiary for SE Europe, close cooperation developed between him and STAERKER and lasted (from October 1942) until Easter 1945. NEUBACHER's connections were useful to STAERKER while the latter supplied, in return, much valuable information which he collected during his numerous journeys through the Balkans, especially Greece.

Three or four trips took STAERKER to Switzerland where he had to settle accounts for Elatuork with the International Red Cross. NEUBACHER never heard of any W/T messages which STAERKER might have sent from there. He remembers one telegram from a Swiss frontier station in which STAERKER announced his impending arrival in WIEN. When he did not arrive until much later, his adversaries made good use of the delay by spreading rumors that STAERKER really had no intentions of returning.

NEUBACHER denies any private financial dealings with STAERKER. He admits that in his official capacity, especially while he was special envoy to Greece, he had many official financial transactions with him. One of the largest of these transactions was intended to support the rate of exchange of the drachma.

Although the rate of exchange of Greek currency was held for one year the position of the drachma became hopeless in late Summer 1943, when the moral backing of the Greek government alone could no longer support the national credit. The food and commodity supply, by means of which the inflation had been held back, was greatly curtailed by Allied bombings, and complete chaos with wild operations on the stock exchange resulted.

HITLER was opposed to any of NEUBACHER's attempts to back up the Greek currency at the expense of the Reich. NEUBACHER convinced the other leaders of the Reich of the necessity, and HITLER finally dropped his arguments, since he did not know much about currency problems. So from November 1943 until the German retreat from Greece, altogether 1.3 million pounds of sterling in gold were sold in monthly installments on the ATHENS stock exchange. Another crisis arose (Summer 1944) with the marked decrease of the monthly gold transfer from Germany and it was then that STAERKER succeeded in holding the drachma by exporting to Hungary cheap agricultural surpluses for payments in gold.

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Early in 1945, STAECKER married NEUBACHER's secretary (name unknown), a native of GRAZ (Austria) who had lived in Yugoslavia. Like her husband, she eventually went to Switzerland. In April 1945, NEUBACHER met STAECKER's two sisters in KITZBUHEL. The older sister had been STAECKER's secretary, but neither she nor her sister knew of their brother's whereabouts.

STAECKER came from PFORZHEIM (Baden), was a South German chauvinist with strong anti-Prussian leanings. He was approximately 35 years old and had been a business man (watches and jewelry?) in PARIS before the war. He was gifted and experienced in matters of finance and foreign trade; an opportunist, but loyally devoted to NEUBACHER. STAECKER's boorishness made him many enemies. Being secretive and an adversary to be reckoned with, he was particularly disliked by von HARLING and the men of von HARLING's and MANECK's staffs. In due time von HARLING's attitude softened, but many others, such as Dr. RUEHLER, remained his implacable enemies until the very end.

NEUBACHER knows definitely that STAECKER never served in the armed forces and had no military rank. He has reason to believe that STAECKER had connections of long standing with the Abwehr, which may have accounted for his not being called to the colors.

The name of Dr. HAECKER (cf. SCHELLENBERG Report, Para XVIII/68 means nothing to NEUBACHER, and he denies ever having known anyone by that name. In comparing the significant circumstances under which NEUBACHER dealt with Dr. HAECKER, with those under which he worked with STAECKER, it may be possible that the two are identical. NEUBACHER admits knowing of STAECKER's having used aliases, but cannot remember any.

(14) W/T Liaison

NEUBACHER denies having ever been concerned with the installation of a W/T station for transmitting intelligence matters directly from Serbia to BERLIN (cf. CIR No 3, ANNEX IV). Military HQ obviously used their wireless equipment for transmitting such messages. NEUBACHER had his own W/T sets at the German legations in BELGRADE, ATHENS, CETINJE, and TIRANA which were in contact with the Auswaertige Amt and through that office, with other central headquarters.

NEUBACHER ruled that before transmittal, all messages pertaining to political matters had to be approved by him at his office in BELGRADE (later VUKOVAR). For contact with KALTENBRUNNER, NEUBACHER sometimes used the W/T station in MANECK's BELGRADE office. Communications to KALTENBRUNNER were camouflaged to appear as reports by C/Fuehrer SCHAEFER reporting on conversations with NEUBACHER (who actually dictated these messages to SCHAEFER and had them sent in a special code.)

After moving to WIEN (November or December 1944) NEUBACHER had a W/T station at his own headquarters in the former French Embassy. He was in direct contact with the Auswaertige Amt and, on two or three occasions, also with MIHALOVICH. The only message from the Serbian leader which NEUBACHER remembers concerned the supply of shoes.

(15) NEUBACHER's Relations with HOETTL and Others of Amt VI-E

NEUBACHER consistently denies ever having had any close associations with HOETTL. As far as he can recollect, he first met him in September 1944 when he visited BUDAPEST to get a report on the internal situation in Hungary from him (HOETTL), whom he knew to be a close collaborator of KALTENBRUNNER. HOETTL seemed greatly dissatisfied with SZALASY.

Further discussions of the Hungarian situation, which affected the fate of WIEN, brought HOETTL to NEUBACHER's WIEN office twice or three times during the Winter of 1944. NEUBACHER does not remember if KALTENBRUNNER was present during the talks at WIEN. HOETTL did not take part in the conferences at GUNDEEN and ALT AUSSEE, and NEUBACHER seems to remember vaguely that HOETTL was reported to be in Switzerland at that time.

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In Switzerland HOETTL and GOETSCH had some connection with an opposition group, known as NS Deutsche Dissidenten. NEULACHER considered these two men, the only members of the opposition group known to him by name, as the more informers (Spitze). This is a typical example of NEULACHER's attitude toward intelligence personnel, whom he consistently terms his inferiors, socially as well as intellectually.

Other contacts in WIEN included Dr WUEHRER, who submitted and discussed intelligence information, and WANECK, who would come for occasional visits. NEULACHER admits that some of KALTENBRUNNER's men may be justified in claiming that they worked hand in glove (unter der selben Decke) with him, because certain of KALTENBRUNNER's men were assigned to be at the beck and call of the Ausserpolitiker (States man), as NEULACHER liked to call himself. They were to support NEULACHER along his lines of policy in the Balkans. The men from Amt VI, according to NEULACHER, considered the Plenipotentiary for SE Europe a sort of oracle whose most casual utterance was scrutinized for potential intelligence value.

The association between KALTENBRUNNER and NEULACHER was based on personal friendship, but NEULACHER disdained any close connection with an informant's clique (his term for the intelligence agency* even with WANECK's office in WIEN, "shop (Laden) 6" in NEULACHER's terminology which was staffed exclusively by Austrians. While he considered KALTENBRUNNER his friend and ally, WANECK and his office were, in his estimation, merely a tool in his Balkan policy.

(16) Hptm LANGE

After the collapse of Italy, HITLER ordered that an independent Albania be organized and NEULACHER was charged with the task. Contact had to be made with a mountain division, commanded by Gen FAHN (?) stationed in the ELBASSAN area, and with Maj von SCHEIGER, an expert on Albania who had lived approximately 20 years in TIRANA as an officer of the Imperial Austrian Army. NEULACHER decided to fly to TIRANA (10 or 12 Sep 45), but a special escort was necessary because the airfield there was controlled by Italians. Through the services of Obst von KOHOUTEK (see para b(1)), NEULACHER established contact with Hptm LANGE, (probably of Div Brandenburg), Abwehr II officer for Albania, who provided him with an escort of 60 - 70 especially picked natives of the Caucasus. (LANGE and his special unit were famous for having parachuted behind the Russian lines and carried out a mission in the GRCZNY oil-fields. The enterprise was a success although only five of the original group, including LANGE, returned.)

NEULACHER does not remember clearly whether LANGE was present at prior meetings in BELGRADE at which prominent Albanian leaders participated, among them DSHAFER DEVA from KOSOVSKA-MITROVICA and VEKRI FRASHERI whose father, MEHDI BEY FRASHERI, later became president of the Albanian regency council.

A close association with LANGE developed as soon as NEULACHER discovered the latter's ability, political acumen, and his special gift of dealing with mountain tribes which he had acquired in his negotiations in the Caucasus. Disregarding his military superiors' displeasure, LANGE, besides attending to his Abwehr duties, also devoted part of his efforts to NEULACHER's service and supplied him with valuable political intelligence. He soon became a well-known personality in Albania. His services to NEULACHER were especially valuable because WANECK's intelligence service in Albania was very poor.

In due time LANGE became NEULACHER's military intelligence executive, more or less unofficially. He was mostly concerned with relations with the various tribes and with problems resulting from guerilla warfare. One of his main missions was the guarding of German supply lines, for which he used Albanian forces because German troops stationed in Albania were barely strong enough to maintain a thin line of defense along the coast.

An attempt at LANGE's life, allegedly a hunting accident, occurred when he and NEULACHER were at Lake Ochrid early in 1944. A prominent physician, Prof SCHOENBAUER, was brought by plane from WIEN and saved LANGE's life, although

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he failed to restore him to full health. After he had recovered he tried to remain in contact with NEUBACHER and was still interested in Albanian matters, although he was greatly handicapped by speech difficulties resulting from his head wound. NEUBACHER last saw LANGE in WIEN during the winter 1944-1945.

The collaboration with Abwehr II gradually disappeared under LANGE's successor, EGGERS (fn and rank unknown). The results were unsatisfactory, and EGGERS, unlike LANGE, did not want to work for NEUBACHER. The Caucasian unit also deteriorated; some men had to be transferred, while others deserted. EGGERS later on became involved in a court martial.

In reply to questions, NEUBACHER denies knowledge of Einheit LAU. As far as he can remember, a unit possibly a regiment, of Div Brandenburg was committed (Sep 44) against TITO in the VALJEVO district. No Brandenburg unit, NEUBACHER claims, was over at his disposal.

(17) TSIRONIKOS

Hector TSIRONIKOS, formerly a wealthy banker in Czarist Russia, had lost his fortune during the 1918 revolution. He then went to France and Belgium and again acquired a considerable fortune. He became one of NEUBACHER's most valuable advisors and informants on Greek questions because he lived outside the country most of the time, and he was not involved in petty domestic politics but was always well-informed on current problems and events. NEUBACHER last saw TSIRONIKOS in KITZBUHNER.

(18) HAHN

Economic intelligence in the Balkans, especially Greece, was supplied by HAHN, Dir b d Reichsbank. He was attached to the German Legation in ATHENS when NEUBACHER took over and made him his deputy on economic questions.

(19) Dr VOLLMAR

During his first visit to CETINJE in his capacity as plenipotentiary NEUBACHER received a certain Dr VOLLMAR (NEUBACHER thinks this to be a cover-name) who represented himself as the local Abwehr agent. VOLLMAR entered NEUBACHER's service and supplied good information which was most welcome since WANECK's information on Montenegro was rather poor. VOLLMAR was eventually killed by Partisans.

(20) WARZINOWSKY IN ATHENS

When NEUBACHER came to ATHENS (November 1942) as special envoy (sonor Beauftragter) for economic and financial questions, he was approached by a certain WARZINOWSKY (WARZINOWSKY?) with whom he discussed the situation in Greece. Although WARZINOWSKY did not state the purpose of his visit, or his business in Greece (cf CIR No 3, ANNEX VI) NEUBACHER gathered that he was connected with the GIS. Since this was before the agreement with KALTENBRUNNER, contact with a GIS agent was most welcome and a closer association gradually developed.

WARZINOWSKY originally came from Central Germany, but under the influence of his beautiful Austrian wife, had become "Austrianized". He had close connections with the prominent Greek politician RHALLIS and had a thorough understanding of Greek politics. Whenever NEUBACHER came to ATHENS, WARZINOWSKY was at hand with new, useful information.

NEUBACHER never knew with which office WARZINOWSKY was associated, but thinks that he was in WANECK's service. When he last saw him (early 1945) in WIEN, WARZINOWSKY was still active in Greek affairs.

(21) Underground Resistance Plans

NEUBACHER denies consistently and with great emphasis any connections

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with Werwolf, stay-behind agents, sabotage plans, or resistance movements of any sort. As one of the most prominent figures in world politics, as he likes to consider himself, he was neither personally nor by virtue of his office concerned with such matters. During the lengthy interrogation his claims seem to be substantiated by the fact that he showed little understanding or appreciation for intelligence insofar as it did not involve his own field of political activity.

The only instances in which NEUBACHER had some remote connection with resistance movements are the following:

(a) When it had become evident beyond the last vestiges of doubt that German resistance was collapsing (April - May 1945), and KALTENBRUNNER seemed "ripe" for discussions of future developments, NEUBACHER approached him with the following suggestions:

1. that any Werwolf or similar resistance plan would be nonsense after the unqualified collapse of the Reich, and that Werwolf was nothing but a bluff, especially since it was supported by GOEBBELS and LEY.

2. If it were already too late to stop the organizing of the Werwolf, the mission of any such movement in Austria, in whose future KALTENBRUNNER and NEUBACHER were particularly interested at that time (see Para c (14)) should be directed exclusively against native Austrian attempts to establish a Soviet regime (Rote Regierung). In no case should any Werwolf action be directed against any of the occupying forces. For this purpose also, all units of the Austrian Volksturm were to be withdrawn to Eastern Austria and to be disbanded with the mission of counter-acting any local, native attempts at Sovietizing the municipal or local administrations. NEUBACHER's main argument in favor of this plan was based on his experiences in Greece where, in his opinion, a foreign-inspired revolution, based on native activities, was prevented only at the last moment by the skill and determination of the British commanding general. As usual, KALTENBRUNNER agreed, and (as far as NEUBACHER can tell) gave the appropriate orders in his capacity as defense commissioner for Austria. He was so deeply impressed with the arguments that he was resolved to devote the time during which he intended to remain in hiding to the personal execution of the plan.

(b) Hptm LANGE and his successor, EGGERS (see para b (16)) were charged with the organization of a resistance movement in Albania. NEUBACHER thinks that the results were nil.

(c) Similar attempts by SD agents to organize a resistance movement in Greece (Summer 1944) met with failure.

(d) Special troops, recruited from LJOTIC's Serbian Volunteers (see para c (6)) were organized toward the end of 1944 and were to infiltrate TITO's lines. They received part of their training from Abwehr personnel, part from SD. Some of the men were committed early in 1945, but the mission was inadequately organized. NEUBACHER did not learn of any positive results.

(e) After the withdrawal of German troops the entire German intelligence system in the Balkans broke down, and NEUBACHER doubts that any German-sponsored underground movement survived.

(22) NEUBACHER's Opinion of GIS

Intelligence, in NEUBACHER's opinion, is a dirty business but a necessary evil. He does not hold the German intelligence system in very high esteem and was very much disappointed when he first came into contact with CANARIS' Abwehr. The reorganization of the Abwehr in 1944 made him hope for better results and increased efficiency, but he was disappointed again when all intelligence activities in Bulgaria, Albania, Mon enegro and Greece ceased as soon as these countries had been overrun by Allied forces. Some little information, mostly from returning soldiers, still leaked through from Rumania, WANECK supplied a few small items on Croatia to NEUBACHER after the latter had moved to WIEN. von HARLING, Ic with Ober Befehls labor Sued-Ost (until March 1945), and WANECK, save for the Croatia information, failed completely.

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The much-praised efficiency of German Intelligence was highly overestimated, and the service itself deteriorated into a demoralized, money-wasting organization. NEUBACHER, who is personally not intelligence minded, learned to rely on other sources, especially his own staff, for information.

c. NEUBACHER's Political Activities

(1) NEUBACHER's Political Outlook

The world, NEUBACHER opines, stands today, at the end of the war, at its most decisive and dramatic cross roads. Never in history was there such an opportunity for revolutionary movements as today.

He goes on further by explaining that only two major powers emerged from World War II; the United States and the Soviet Union. The British Commonwealth in its several parts is dependent on one of the two other powers. Even before the war, France could no longer be counted among the major powers. Germany is utterly defeated and can no longer fulfill her mission of being the connecting link between all the other European border-countries - and NEUBACHER maintains that all other countries in pre-war Europe were border-countries. She can no longer serve as the bulwark against the Soviet Union whose aim and destiny has always been the world revolution, he believes.

There will be an era of dualism. The USA will fulfill its world mission, which may not yet be fully understood by many Americans. It will become the leader of the awakening forces in Europe and will guide them towards a new era, based on American ideas and ideals, by forming a strong cultural bridgehead in Europe around which the European forces may gather to counter the Asiatic flood.

Russia will be the opposing force. If the USSR should become the overlord of Europe, the world would be led along the road to bolshevization. Any further signs of America's indifference toward European problems would allow the now leaderless European countries to slide into closer association with the USSR, in spite of their antithetical traditions, culture, and mentality. Eventually this might lead to an anti-American Europe under Russian leadership, although pro-American feelings in Europe are stronger today than they ever were in history.

There is no other choice, according to NEUBACHER, who emphasizes again and again that he is one of the few men whose knowledge of Russia, Central, and Eastern Europe is based on long practical experience. Any policy aiming at a balance of power or some other compromise between the two remaining major world powers would be doomed to failure.

NEUBACHER freely admits his anti-bolshevik bias because he cannot visualize the modern civilized world working smoothly within any sort of bolshevik system, not even if this system were modified to suit Western European standards. The Bolshevik idea, far remote from theoretical communism, is incompatible with the European culture, tradition, and mentality, in NEUBACHER's opinion.

The danger of a communist revolution and the potential power of Russia became evident to him during a conversation with KRAJEWSKI, president of "Exportless", in December 1932, when he was on one of the frequent business trips which took him to MOSCOW as a commercial representative of Austria. KRAJEWSKI tried to convince NEUBACHER that a bolshevik revolution in Germany was inevitable. It would be one of the most important steps toward the world revolution. Moreover, Germany was a potential economic and political complement of Russia, and German Russian cooperation would result in the exchange of German technical potentials for Russian raw materials, and of the mass of the Russian peoples with the German ability for organization.

KRAJEWSKI's telling argument was: "It may cost us generations, but the day will come when the USSR will be the leading power in the world." KRAJEWSKI was primarily a general commanding a corps of the Red Army, but he was also influential in other Russian spheres. He conducted negotiations with Henry FORD and was the Russian commercial representative in South America.

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Consistent with his philosophy, NEUBACHER admits that his main activity, especially in SE Europe, was from the beginning directed against bolshevik penetration. It was also his official political mission. HITLER's order of 28 Oct 44, which was inspired by NEUBACHER, called for political action against the Soviets by mobilization of national forces. NEUBACHER was charged with this mission in SE Europe in his capacity as special plenipotentiary of the Auswaertige Amt. He tried repeatedly, especially in the South, to gather around him all persons whose previous activities seemed to vouch for their political reliability, and to exert his influence on local politicians and have them follow his own political idea.

(2) German Policy in SE Europe

Although NEUBACHER denies having been an adherent of the NAUMANN school of political thought, his own ideas roughly coincide with the Mittel-Europa concept of that school. He contends that SE Europe, as an economic unit, is in need of a continental market for its surplus agricultural products. The logical consumer is Central Europe (Greater Germany), which at the same time, as a producer of manufactured products, complements the exchange by exporting finished goods to the countries which supply it with agricultural products. Mittel Europa (evidently NEUBACHER takes it for granted that it must be led by Germany) would form the nucleus of the European economic system, and SE Europe would form an economic bloc with Greater Germany. The political implications are clear-cut and obvious and call, at least, for close political cooperation within the natural sphere of interest.

The Italo-German agreement of May 1938 which established the economically unnatural Italian sphere of interest along the W and SW coast of the Balkan peninsula was one of the major political blunders of the Third Reich and formed a major stumbling-block in Germany's SE European policy, NEUBACHER believes.

While the German policy for SE was generally oriented along natural economic lines (see above), it followed unfortunately (in NEUBACHER's opinion), no clear-cut aims subsequent to the occupation of the Balkans. One reason for this floundering was the agreement with Italy. The other, and in NEUBACHER's opinion, decisive factor was the indecision within the circles surrounding HITLER, who followed the maxim of leaving all European and postwar problems alone until the end of the war. It was even taboo to mention postwar questions in HITLER's presence.

Such shortsighted policy could have been understood in the case of RIEBENTROP who was simply unable to settle any far-reaching political problem. It was more difficult to explain HITLER's attitude. NEUBACHER thinks that HITLER might have lost appreciation and interest in political questions with his growing zeal for strategy and things military. HITLER's state of health under Prof MARELL's care (see ANNEX II) might also serve as an explanation. The following incident may be significant of his attitude: NEUBACHER reported to HITLER on some current Balkan question and during his report compared the Balkans to a worn-out wooden box in need of some nails for reinforcement. HITLER replied promptly, "The best nails are my divisions".

Under these circumstances NEUBACHER found it very difficult to carry out a political plan supplanting his economic ideas. Germany had, of course, to secure the support of one of the major Balkan powers, and the choice caused much trouble. Bulgaria was still considered the only faithful ally. The myth of the "Prussians of the East" was still popular, and an official pro-Bulgarian policy was sponsored by RIEBENTROP and the completely incompetent German representative in SOFIA, SA C/Gruf BECKERLE, a former police president and a typical, stupid Party product who finally committed suicide. The pro-Bulgarian policy of the Auswaertige Amt was a shining example of the poor diplomacy of the Third Reich.

HITLER also favored the Bulgarians, partly through RIEBENTROP's influence, partly because of his anti-Serbian prejudice. It is interesting to note NEUBACHER states, that HITLER, in spite of his notorious aversion to everything Austrian, could not rid himself of the typically Austrian anti-Serbian complex.

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The logical choice, in NEUBACHER's opinion, would have been to follow a pro-Serbian policy, because (1) the Serbs were the only Balkan nation that showed any talent for organizing a well-ordered state, and (2) sentiment among the influential well-to-do peasants was conservative and anti-communist. The traditional friendship for Russia was decreasing as the aversion to Soviet ideas grew. At the same time pro-Russian sentiment was on the upgrade in Bulgaria where it was fostered by the exponents of strongly pro-communist social theories. (of c (3)). NEUBACHER was in sharp disagreement with the Auswaertige Amt which regarded the Bulgarians as more pro-German than the Serbs. Although he criticizes RIBBENTROP's failure to plan for German post-war projects in the Balkans and to conduct his policy accordingly, he cannot offer a clear and detailed plan and limits his ideas to settlements of only temporary importance. He suggests, for instance, that at the end of the war all former SE European lands of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy should be returned to Austria, and therefore to Germany, but when questioned, strongly repudiates the plan of Germanizing the nations concerned (Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, etc). Nor will he admit any plan for the federalization of these countries within a Greater Germany.

Yugoslavia should not be revived, but on the other hand, NEUBACHER favors the idea of a Greater Serbia. Even Croatia was to be included in Greater Serbia, unless it were to be incorporated into Germany or to become a kingdom under an Italian prince, as provided for in the agreement of March 1938. HITLER, however, was opposed to enlarging Serbian territory beyond the confines of Serbia proper ("Rest Serbian"). NEUBACHER also claims that he favored the old Austro-Hungarian policy of supporting the Moslem elements in the Balkans. All of his plans, however, are vague. It seems that either there are no clear-cut solutions, or that he is unwilling to admit that his general ideas, following the MAULAN pattern, meant nothing but the subjugation, political and economic of the Balkan countries.

His temporary aims are far more clearly defined, and HITLER's orders of 29 Oct 44 was written by NEUBACHER. Its principal ideas were: mobilization of all national forces against bolshevism, abandonment of the two-front war (against the Chetniks and TITO), moral pacification, and coordination of German policy throughout SE Europe. HITLER was not in full agreement with the last point of the order because of RIBBENTROP's ill-advised pro-Bulgarian and pro-Croatian bias. Neither country was included in NEUBACHER's assignment despite his argument that TITO's action was only a forerunner of the Sovietization of all of SE Europe with the aim of bringing the Dardanelles under Russian control.

(3) Position of the USSR in the Balkans

In outlining the political position of the USSR in the Balkans NEUBACHER voiced the following opinions.

(a) Conditions Favorable to Soviet Political Penetration

1. Bulgaria

- a. The traditional affection for Russia
- b. Common religion and a basic kinship of language
- c. A possible tendency toward collectivism as evidenced in a highly-developed net of cooperatives, and a social structure characterized by the prevalence of small farmers.
- d. The inefficiency of the German Minister to SOFIA, BECKERLE, who managed to convince RIBBENTROP that NEUBACHER's reports, which spoke of growing numbers of Communist sympathizers were inaccurate.
- e. The weak, ineffectual rule of King BORIS. BORIS was strongly influenced by the Sect of occultist Demogists led by a certain TULTSHEFF and the architect SEMOFF. SEMOFF had once been "the power behind KEMAL ATATURK's throne" while he was officially employed as architectural advisor at ANKARA. TULTSHEFF and SEMOFF were later condemned to death by the Bulgarian People's court.

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f. An impoverished intelligentsia. (There were three times as many attorneys in SOFIA as there were in HAMBURG)

2. Montenegro

- a. The poverty existing within this bare, mountainous country.
- b. The majority of the young university men had studied at the University of Belgrade which, before the war, was known for its Communist leanings.

3. Albania

- a. The youth of the country was without any guidance in a country which was a state on paper only. In reality it was a territory populated by an association of tribes ruled in a feudal, oriental fashion.
- b. The open corruption of the Italian occupational regime caused widespread discontent and provided fertile soil for social revolution.

4. Croatia

- a. The Ustasha regime of Ante PAVELIC. This was the greatest blunder in the Axis policy in SE Europe
- b. The outstanding popularity of TITO (Josip BROZ)

5. Greece

- a. The poor economic situation in Greece under German control
- b. The incorrect Italian policy of establishing spheres of influence gave ELAS and EAM the opportunity to hoist the national banner.

6. Bosnia and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar

Religious persecution of the Moslems by the Chetniks and Ustashes

The USSR's skillful propaganda, urging resistance to the occupying forces, was in NEURACHER's opinion her greatest political asset. He mentioned no conditions unfavorable to Soviet political penetration in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Albania, Croatia, Greece, Bosnia, and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar.

(b) Conditions Unfavorable to Soviet Political Penetration

1. Rumania

- a. The average Rumanian lives in a patriarchal society. He is substantially an individualist and has strong aversions against collectivism. Cooperatives never succeeded in Rumania.
- b. Food supplies have always been adequate.
- c. The ANTONESCU regime pursued a strong anti-Communist policy.
- d. Corruption, which in other countries had been fertile ground for social revolt, had become such an integral part of the Rumanian system that it could no longer serve as an effective revolutionary incentive.
- e. The agrarian reform after World War I had done much to pacify the small farmers and served as a bar against Communist propaganda. A significant example of the political attitude of the workers was the MELAKA concerns election to the Workers Council, Spring 1945.

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Pro-Soviet elements polled less than 10% of the vote. This resulted in the sudden appearance of VYSHINSKI in BUCHAREST.

2. Serbia.

- a. The Serb has a natural aversion to Communism. He adheres to a patriarchal society, is orthodox, "Balkan conscious", nationalistic, and has a talent for state organization.
- b. The average farms are of medium size, and the Serbian farming class is relatively prosperous.
- c. The "correct" policy toward the Chetniks and other Serbian national movements pursued by NEUBACHER.

NEUBACHER mentioned no factors favorable to Soviet political penetration in Rumania and Serbia.

(c) Centers of Soviet Activity

1. The Soviet Legation in SOFIA, long the center for the Sovietization of the Balkans
2. TITO's mobile headquarters in Croatia
3. S. Albania and N. Greece
4. ATHENS and the Peloponnesus. A certain KAROS, an experienced Soviet agent, caused the British considerable trouble in the Peloponnesus.

(d) Soviet Civil War Strategy

To achieve a complete Sovietization of the Balkans it was planned that anti-Communist Serbia be enclosed by pincers from Bulgaria and Croatia. To close the gap, a "Red Zipper" was planned between these two countries. Partisan movements were to form bridges, one in Montenegro to connect with Albania, another in Central Greece connecting Northern Greece with the Peloponnesus. It is interesting to note that the "zipper" followed the line of the Italian zone of interests.

(e) NEUBACHER's Anti-Soviet Plan

A medium-sized Serbia, including Old Serbia, Montenegro and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar was planned by NEUBACHER, who considered that such a state would form a reliable bulwark against the ascendance of Communism in the Balkans. Moreover, this plan could not be put into effect because of HITLER's persistent anti-Serbian bias which was founded on the time-honored idea of the "Serbian wasp-nest" of 1914, which was revived in 1941.

NEUBACHER further planned to activate all national elements in Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Albania, and Herzegovina, to counter-act the Soviet infiltration, and proposed for this purpose a truce with all these groups and movements.

Pro-German sympathies were to be furthered by a lessening of the hardships on the conquered nations. NEUBACHER proposed in this connection a relief of the critical food situation in Greece, Albania, and Montenegro, relaxation of the rigid price regulations in BELGRADE (NEUBACHER had had experience in suppressing black markets), the establishing of free open markets in Greece; the suppression of routine shootings of hostages and other reprisals; revival of national and cultural life; reopening of BELGRADE University, and similar measures.

(f) Soviet Activities and Agents

The Soviets were masters in camouflaging their underground activities. Soviet agents operating with TITO and ELAS did their work inconspicuously and kept out of the limelight. Bulgarian Communists played important roles as

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agents in Greece where their cruelty, including such refinements as the "three day death", were notorious. Others invaded Albania, where TITO sent more than 100 commissars after the German retreat. NEUBACHER claims that there were no Albanians among the so-called Albanian Communists, but that the group was made up of Russians, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs exclusively.

Since all Soviet agents, with the exception of TITO, were kept from achieving prominence, NEUBACHER could not recall the names of any of them. There was an important chief agent in hiding somewhere near SEMLIN, but the BELGIAN police never discovered the man's name or hiding place, although they were usually successful in preventing Soviet agents from operating in the city.

(g) Soviet "Trial Balloon"

In summer 1944, Prof JONIC, Minister of Education in NEDIC's cabinet, was approached by a friend who had close ties with high Soviet circles, with a message which obviously was intended for NEUBACHER's ears. The unofficial emissary stated approximately the following:

"The following opinion prevails among high Communist leaders: Germany cannot come to terms with the Western Allies because ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL are committed against making any agreements with the National Socialist government. The hands of the Soviet government are not tied in that respect. A satisfactory conclusion of the war depends on a Russo-German reconciliation. The implied purpose of the war is to drive the King and the ruling class from England to Canada and, as soon as the continent has been "cleaned up", England can be invaded by the Germans. Germany will be secured in the East by an agreement with the USSR. A German controlled England will no longer serve as the American bridge-head for the Eurasian continent. The USSR has no territorial claims but will accept no compromise in the Dardanelles. All of these aims can only be achieved through a separate Russo-German peace. The Western Allies, naturally, will never agree to these objectives but will do their utmost to cheat the USSR of the fruits of an Allied victory."

The speed of developments in the Balkans prevented NEUBACHER from taking steps in connection with this pseudo-feeler.

(h) Outline of German-Soviet Relations shortly before 1941

Although he had been active in missions involving relations with the USSR, NEUBACHER never learned the full extent of the RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV Pact of August 1939. He understands that the agreement gave the USSR a free hand in Finland and the Baltic states, and the right to occupy Bessarabia. He knows definitely that during a visit to BERLIN (1941) MOLOTOV claimed that the USSR had to have freedom of action in Bulgaria and in the Dardanelles question, and that Rumania had to come under the Russian sphere of interests. HITLER refused these demands outright, and it became obvious in leading German circles that war with the USSR was imminent.

(4) Various Groups, Guerilla Bands and Personalities in NEUBACHER's Sphere of Activity - Autumn 1943 - Spring 1945

(a) Introduction

The division of these groups is purposely organized along NEUBACHER's line of differentiation. According to him there were only two main groups. One he termed the "National", and the other the "Red" or TITO group. According to NEUBACHER it would be pointless to distinguish between anti and pro-German parties inasmuch as, except for some few persons, there never were any really pro-German groups in the Balkans. Moreover, between Autumn 1943 - Spring 1945 the German occupation had become of secondary consideration, since its fate had already been sealed in the opinion of the groups concerned.

Croatia and Slovenia are not included in the Survey since they were not within NEUBACHER's sphere of activity and he is therefore less familiar with events there. The famous Croatian politician, Dr MACEK, had not been active. The other groups, with the exception of the Ustashes, were at best of purely local importance.

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(b) Serbia

1. Nationalist Groups

a. Governmental group of Col Gen Milan NEDIC, Serbian Prime Minister since 1941, who governed, curiously enough, mainly "in statu domissionis". Despite assisting in a half-hearted manner he was nevertheless never a collaborator. NEDIC had the following armed forces at his disposal.

- (1) "Serbian State Guard" (former gendarmerie), consisting of approximately 12,000 men under Gen JONIC. JONIC was last seen 1945 in Verariberg, Austria.
- (2) "Serbian Border Guard", 1000 crack troops. The commanding officer was a Slovene, was formerly an Obst in the Imperial Austrian Army. He was last seen in WIEN early in 1945.
- (3) The BELGRADE Police, a specialized anti-Communist unit led by the Mayor and Police President, Draja JOVANCIC, who was a personal foe of NEDIC.
- (4) The "Sbor" movement, led by LJOTIC (see para c.(6)) supported NEDIC and had an armed force known as the "Serbian Volunteer Corps". This force was under the command of Gen MUSHITZKY and Lt Col TATALOVIC and had a maximum of 2,500 men.
- (5) The Chetniks (see para c (5)), led by Gen Draja MIHAILOVICH and his Chief of Staff, Gen TUFUANCIC. This organization consisted of approximately 50,000 combat troops and approximately 10,000 unarmed reserves. Some of the more prominent Vojvods (group leaders) were KALACIC, KESEROVIC, LUKACEVIC, NEDIC, PASARAC, PEROVIC (operating in Herzegovina, PILETIC, RACIC and RAKOVIC. RAKOVIC was presumably killed in 1945 but may still be in hiding. Pop LJUTIC operate semi-independently in Croatia.

2. Communist Groups

The only Red Group in Serbia operated in the Leskovac area under the leadership of "TEMPO" (a cover-name) and some Bulgarian Army officers. Most of the personnel consisted of Bulgarian Army deserters. This caused the strength of the group to vary and its exact strength was unknown.

(c) Montenegro

1. Nationalist Groups

- a. The supporters of the "Narodna Uprava" which was a form of committee governing the country. The committee was led by its president, Ljubomir VUKSANOVIC, and was officially recognized by the Germans. He acted in close cooperation with NEDIC in Serbia. The "Narodna Uprava" had several thousand troops known as the "Montenegrin Volunteers" at its disposal.
- b. A guerilla band of 3,000-10,000 men led, by Pavle DJURISIC, who are originally Chetniks. Later they became completely independent and fought mainly against the "Reds".
- c. Many small Chetnik guerilla bands, the names and approximate strength of which have been forgotten.

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2. Communist Group

A group led by Roco DAPCEVIC, a 28 year old student. He was a disciple of TITO and a devout Communist.

(d) Albania

1. Nationalist Groups

- a. The "Government" Group which had been recognized by the Germans since 1943. This group was anti-Italian. NEUBACHER stresses that it ruled the country on the basis of free elections. NEUBACHER personally flew Mehdi Bey FRASHERI, head of the Regency Council, from Italy where he had been interned. Other important personalities in that group included Dshafir DEVA (see para C.(9)), Minister of the Interior and, since 1944 President of the Kossovean Liga; Ibrahim Bey BICAKU, Prime Minister; TSALAMI, President of the Parliament; and KRASNIGI, Vice President of the Parliament.
- b. A series of tribes, of which the following were of greatest importance:
 - (1) The "Miridits", a Catholic tribe, led by Capitan (Duke) Gjon Marka GJON. The Miridits were of paramount influence in Northern Albania.
 - (2) The "Dibraner", the leader of which was Figri DINA; the leading tribe of Western Albania.
 - (3) The "Bicaku" who captured the British Gen DAVIES. He was later transferred to German custody and held in the Reich. NEUBACHER does not recall the name of Bicaku leader.
 - (4) A tribe led by "The Formidable", who was the chief guerilla leader of Southern Albania.
 - (5) The Ball COMBETAR group, the main aim of which was to oppose the Italians.

2. Communist Groups

- a. A tribe led by Mahmed SHEHU, who had affiliations with TITO.
- b. A tribe led by Ismail DAVA, a Communist guerilla leader.

3. Neutral Groups

A neutral group of about 3000 combat men, led by Abas KUPI, maintained good relations with both the Nationalists and the Communists. Its main purpose was to effect the restoration of King ZOG. The group operated between Scutari and Tirana. A British mission was attached to it.

(e) Greece

1. Nationalist Groups

a. Collaborationist group led by the following men:

- (1) Gen TSOLAKOGLU, Prime Minister, 1941-December-1942.
- (2) Prof ZOGOTHEOTOPULOS, Prime Minister, December 1942-March 1943.
- (3) RHALLYS, Prime Minister from March 1943 on.
- (4) TSIRONIKOS, independent Minister of Economic Welfare, deputy Prime Minister from December 1942 on.
- (5) TAVULARIS, Italian-sponsored Minister of the Interior 1941-May 1945.
- (6) PASADAKIS, Governor of Crete, who has been described as a "madman".

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The armed forces at the disposal of this group included the gendarmerie and the police of ATHENS whose 18,000 troops were strongly saturated with Communists. In addition, the "Evzonean" regiments which consisted of approximately 4,000 men, led by the veteran revolutionist Col TERTILLYS, had been operating since 1941.

- b. "Friends of the Hitler Movement" were an unimportant group of political gamblers.
 - c. The "EEE", led by GULAS, was a Nazi type movement which at one time was persecuted by METAKAS.
 - d. The "EDES" was the paramount national liberation movement. NEUBACHER describes it as being democratic, anti-German, and anti-Italian. The movement was closely associated with RHALLYS. Its leading figure was VULPIOTIS although he was not the titular head. At first, Col Napoleon SERVAS was the military leader, but he later operated independently.
 - e. National liberation guerilla bands which operated independently
- (1) Col Napoleon SERVAS originally had 2,000 and later 15,000 men in Northern Greece. He was strongly supported by the British who maintained a military mission at his Hq. He concentrated his efforts primarily against the ELAS and had a truce with the Germans. At one time, the British managed to bring SERVAS and PSAROS to terms with the ELAS. SERVAS was experienced enough in ELAS tactics not to take the truce too seriously. PSAROS accepted the truce in good faith and became careless. As a result, his positions and ranks were infiltrated by the ELAS and he and his men were eventually slaughtered.
 - (2) Col PSAROS (mentioned above) had 5,000-10,000 of his men wiped out by the ELAS.
 - (3) Of Col PSAROS' forces approximately 1,000 men went over to the Communists.
 - (4) Col SPIRIDOS led an independent group of approximately 1,000 men.
 - (5) "Leonidas" was a free corps operating in the Peloponnesus. It was a sort of National Guard, the primary interest of which was not politics but defense against the pillaging and looting of ELAS guerillas.
 - (6) The "Bulgarian Corps" was by no means national although it was anti-Red. It consisted of approximately 2,000-3,000 Bulgars who were organized and armed by the German von HEIDE (rank unknown). The Corps was of local significance on the Bulgarian border.

2. Communist Groups

- a. EAM, a political party which was, according to NEUBACHER, manipulated behind the scenes by the Communists. It originated as a liberation movement but later became an openly Communist group.
- b. ELAS was a combination of fighting partisan groups led by the Greek Communist Party. As is usual in Soviet-sponsored organizations, none of the leaders became very prominent. NEUBACHER remembers two minor leaders: KAROS(?) who proclaimed a Soviet Republic in the Peloponnesus in Spring of 1945 and DIOS(?), a former member of the Greek Parliament who may have been acting as the leader of a guerilla band in the Olympus area under an alias. All the ELAS groups had Russian liaison officers who never acted openly. There were also Bulgarian commissars and Bulgarian Communist agents who infiltrated the ranks.

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- c. There were many small parties, partisan groups, and cliques in Greece with all sorts of different leanings. These groups fluctuated from one side to the other. British Intelligence was very efficient and had a large well-organized net of agents.

(5) Draža MIHAILOVICH

(a) Political ideas

Although MIHAILOVICH had been fighting the Germans since 1941, he was almost certainly prepared for some degree of cooperation with them by 1943, after NEUBACHER's arrival in the Balkans. At that time MIHAILOVICH came to the conclusion that the Germans could no longer be considered the number one enemy since they would eventually be forced to leave the country anyway. On the other hand, it appeared to him that the MOSCOW-sponsored TITO (Josip BROZ) movement would never loosen its hold once it attained a firm grip on the country. The aims of this movement were clearly incompatible with the idea of the federal, democratic monarchy MIHAILOVICH had long envisioned.

NEUBACHER's policy ran along similar lines:

1. To end the German two-front fight in Yugoslavia, i.e. against the Chetniks and TITO's Partisans.
2. To base the German policy in the Balkans on Serbian nationalist, anti-Communist groups such as those led by LJOTIC, NEDIC, and MIHAILOVICH.
3. To encourage these groups to combat the Soviet infiltration, convincing them that it constituted a far greater threat to the social and national structures of the countries concerned than did Germany. After final Nazi victory (which seemed certain to NEUBACHER at that time) Germany would withdraw from the Balkans, and although she would naturally take measures to safeguard her own economic interests, she would grant the Balkan nations a far greater degree of independence than would a Soviet-sponsored regime.
4. To agree with these elements on a modus vivendi for the duration of the war.
5. To cease all cruelties and reprisals, such as shooting of hostages.

(b) Cooperation with the Germans

Once this basis for understanding had been found, the first contact between NEUBACHER and MIHAILOVICH was established through the former minister, ACIMOVIC, who served as MIHAILOVICH's liaison officer. A personal meeting was scheduled for late Autumn 1943 and NEUBACHER received authorization from his government to grant MIHAILOVICH a safe-conduct for that purpose. This meeting never took place, largely because the British still had a mission and agents in the Chetnik camp. They had not been withdrawn even though Britain was by then supplying TITO with stores of supplies.

NEUBACHER started to pave the way for German-Chetnik collaboration by encouraging local Wehrmacht commanders to reach agreements with local Chetnik leaders. The Reich empowered him to act as the highest authority in settling all guerrilla problems and negotiating with guerrilla bands in the Balkans (excepting those in Rumania, Bulgaria and Croatia).

Several agreements directed against TITO were reached with the Vojjevods (Chetnik Leaders); with KALABIC, in Central Serbia and BELGRADE, and with LUKACEVIC in the Sanjak of Novi Basar and E Montenegro. The agreements pledged mutual toleration, Chetnik recognition of NEDIC's local authorities, the grant of safe-conducts for German supplies by the Chetniks, and joint action against TITO. In some instances agreement was made for Germany to supply ammunition and medical equipment, and to treat wounded Chetniks in German hospitals.

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Despite the agreements, NEUBACHER claims that there was still no real German-Chetnik collaboration. Clashes with the Wehrmacht and with NEDIC's forces still occurred. Perhaps the best results were attained at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 following the agreement with LUKACEVIC. Even this agreement degenerated after LUKACEVIC left for CAIRO on a mission seeking to counteract pro-TITO policy. NEUBACHER heard that the British had held him under arrest for a short time, although LUKACEVIC appeared later at King PETER's wedding in LONDON. When he returned to his guerilla bands to organize an independent uprising against the Germans in Herzegovina (September 1944) he was presupposing an imminent British landing on the neighboring shores of Dalmatia. The uprising met with the disapproval of MIHAILOVICH and with counter action by TITO.

The so-called "Sturmkorps" (assault troops) of RAKOVIC, NEDIC, and RACIC, and, to a lesser degree, the forces of KALEBIC and KESSEROVIC, were held well in hand by MIHAILOVICH. Some independent guerilla leaders like the Orthodox priest, DJUIC, and the notorious Pavle DJURISIC in Montenegro, collaborated with the Germans. DJURISIC had been a German captive but was released by NEUBACHER in the Autumn of 1943. MIHAILOVICH sometimes warned NEUBACHER about some of the less "reliable" guerilla leaders, including FILETIC, who was operating in the NE corner of Serbia. FILETIC finally went over to the Russians without a single follower.

(c) Contacts with Foreigners

The British mission, and possibly the British agents, left MIHAILOVICH early in 1944. NEUBACHER does not remember their names although von HARLING (ic, O/Bef Sued Ost) had at one time submitted a complete roster of names of the British mission to him.

Early in 1944 (perhaps before the departure of the British mission) a US mission led by Col MACDONELL arrived at MIHAILOVICH's Hq. (see c.(11))

Since the spring of 1944, a certain Maj WEIL(?), Ritterkreuztraeger, had served as the German liaison officer with MIHAILOVICH's Hq. His function was to foster closer collaboration based on the previously-mentioned local agreements. NEUBACHER was in constant communication with MIHAILOVICH through the latter's liaison officer, ACHNOVIC, and occasionally through Rudi STAMMER. (See b. (13)).

(NEUBACHER mentions incidentally that once when the Germans overran TITO's Hq he had an opportunity to read some personal notes written by Randolph CHURCHILL in 1944. NEUBACHER was struck by CHURCHILL's comments on the "vulgar" treatment he received from TITO. It appeared also that TITO arrested any Briton of influence in the Croatian zone who did not report to him as willing to be of service.

(d) Climax of Cooperation and the Collapse

The entrance of Soviet troops into SE Europe definitely threw the forces aligned with MIHAILOVICH into the German camp. July 1944 MIHAILOVICH, LJOTIC, and NEDIC jointly asked for German aid in the form of ammunition, weapons and medical equipment. The aid was never forthcoming in sufficient volume since the Germans themselves were short of the supplies requested.

The Germans concentrated mostly on the defense of the East (Serbia). MIHAILOVICH, on the other hand, tried to prevent TITO's advance in the West from Croatia and in Montenegro. MIHAILOVICH was defeated in several battles in the Valjevo-Usice area in September-October 1944 by TITO's partisans who were numerically superior in both men and material. The Partisan force of appr 40,000 men finally pushed MIHAILOVICH westward over the Drina. MIHAILOVICH's difficulties and fate were shared by MACDONELL's mission. November-December 1944 MIHAILOVICH concentrated his Chetniks on Croatian and Bosnian soil. This resulted in conflict with the German-sponsored Ustasha regime.

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NEUBACHER remained in touch with MIHAILOVICH through ACIMOVIC and with W/T communication from his head office in WIEN. (See 1. (14)). He was later able to maintain liaison through LJOTIC. As a result NEUBACHER was able to receive news indicating that at the beginning of 1945 MIHAILOVICH was still in contact with certain other Serbian collaborationist formations which had escaped into the Gorizia-Fiume area. These were namely: LJOTIC with appr 7,000 men of the former NEDIC faction, DJUIC with appr 7,000 Dalmatian Chetniks, and Vojvoda JEFDJELVIC with appr 2500 Bosnian Chetniks.

NEUBACHER last heard of MIHAILOVICH in April 1945 while visiting LJOTIC in Istria. A wireless message had arrived from MIHAILOVICH stating that he had not joined the Germans (LOEHR) in their retreat, that his position was difficult, and that his forces now numbered only 10,000-20,000 men, and were undergoing extreme hardship. NEUBACHER believes MIHAILOVICH later made every effort to reach the Western Allied lines.

(c) Conclusion

NEUBACHER says that Draja MIHAILOVICH never ceased to regard and treat the Germans as foes. Even during the period when he was forced to cooperate with them in the above-mentioned limited manner, his broadcasts and his agents continued to urge resistance against Germans as an enemy occupying power. Later the importance of his propaganda efforts lessened, being overshadowed by TITO's brilliant professional propaganda campaign. TITO did everything to discredit MIHAILOVICH in the eyes of his countrymen and the Allies. Many of the so-called "facts" of MIHAILOVICH's conspiracy with the Germans were outright inventions of TITO's propaganda which since the end of 1941 had been echoed by the British. NEUBACHER stresses that MIHAILOVICH was always highly esteemed by everyone who knew the truth of his dealings, including his foes. In fact, the Germans respected him for his fair play, character, and the heroic stubbornness with which he fought until the very end for the cause of his king and an independent Yugoslavia.

Since MIHAILOVICH was primarily a soldier and not a very able politician, he was unable to find a solution when confronted by a political triangle comprising Germany, TITO, and the British.

Among the higher German officials, NEUBACHER alone sponsored MIHAILOVICH as a foundation for his pro-Serbian Balkan policy. Other German authorities, particularly in the Wehrmacht, did not trust MIHAILOVICH at all. Von HARLING, for instance, warned constantly of eventual treachery by the Chetniks. NEUBACHER stresses that MIHAILOVICH, although a fanatical anti-Communist, clearly differentiated between the Red Army as an Allied Army, and TITO's native forces. According to MIHAILOVICH's orders, the anti-Communist struggle was to be concentrated against TITO's local Yugoslav revolution, and any clash with the Red Army was to be avoided.

(6) LJOTIC (fnu)

LJOTIC was the founder and leader of the "SBOR". This was a Serbian, nationalistic, anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, anti-Freemason, so-called revival movement based on the religious and social idea of a return to the simple form of life within a peasant, patriarchal social structure. LJOTIC was a fanatically religious, puritanical type of people's prophet. He was often called "The Saint".

LJOTIC supported the German-sponsored NEDIC movement since its inception in 1941. He was the leader of the "Serbian Volunteer Corps", an elite corps among the various nationalistic Serbian guerilla bands. NEUBACHER stresses the high morale of LJOTIC's bands, which consisted mostly of fanatical anti-Communist Serbian students and intellectuals. NEUBACHER claims that LJOTIC's volunteers not only had a Serbian, but also a "European" aspect. Despite LJOTIC's attempts to expand the Corps to 15,000 men it never exceeded a strength of approxi-

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mately 9,500. Since 1941 they were in permanent conflict with opposition guerilla bands, particularly the Communists. 45% of them became casualties.

They also fought MIHAILOVICH's Chetniks although the basis for a certain amount of cooperation with MIHAILOVICH had been instituted in July 1944. (See para c.(5)). That cooperation resulted, for instance, in LJOTIC and some of MIHAILOVICH's groups joining in a common fight against TITO in Istria.

When the Germans were forced to evacuate BELGRADE, NEUBACHER managed to move the LJOTIC Volunteers into Istria via Slovenia and Graz in order to secure the Gorizia-Fiume area against TITO's activities. NEUBACHER's contact with LJOTIC was permanent and mostly personal. He saw LJOTIC for the last time while paying him a visit in Istria in April 1945. His visit was made for the purpose of advising LJOTIC to surrender himself and his men to the Western Allies in the event of further German retreats. According to rumors which reached NEUBACHER, the volunteers did actually surrender to the British and were interned. LJOTIC, himself, was killed in an accident shortly after NEUBACHER's last visit.

LJOTIC had two professional military advisers, both of whom were former regular officers of the Imperial Austrian Army. They were Gen MUSHITZKY who was CO of the Serbian Volunteer Corps and Lt Col TITLOVIC, who was the Chief of Staff of the Corps.

(7) NEDIC's Memoranda and Concentration Camps

NEDIC left BELGRADE in October 1944 and, after a short stay in WIEN came to the Grand Hotel in KITZBUHTEL, where NEUBACHER gradually assembled all "hi SE Europeans and where they formed a typical emigres' club (Emigranten Cafe), complete with unproductive discussions, cliques, and quarrels. NEDIC plunged into the atmosphere and showed no more signs of real political activity. He soon became "Papa" NEDIC.

NEUBACHER states that NEDIC never had a political line of his own but had been largely guided by LJOTIC's, and later by MIHAILOVICH's policies, but through lengthy interrogation IO had arrived at the conclusion that NEUBACHER was material in shaping most of NEDIC's policy. Generally, NEDIC seems to have been a faint-hearted politician who maintained faithfully only the two principles of safeguarding the monarchy and of defending Yugoslavia against collectivist tendencies.

Early in 1945 NEDIC sent NEUBACHER a memorandum, a confused and contradictory document which had been composed by the old men of his cabinet. The note expressed refusal on part of the government to collaborate further in view of the tragic situation of the Serbian people. It particularly disapproved of the activities of the Istrian group (LJOTIC, DJUIC) because of the resulting reprisals against the population by TITO, and it pointed out the international obligations of Yugoslavia, a point which roused NEUBACHER's indignation. It was obvious that the document was written in view of the imminent defeat of the German rule in the Balkans.

NEUBACHER points out that he did not forward the document to his superior authorities, as he should have done, because he himself realized the hopelessness of the German position and therefore considered it unfair and impolitic to expose NEDIC unnecessarily under these circumstances. On the other hand, NEUBACHER lost all respect for NEDIC as a politician after he had read the memorandum.

Another note from NEDIC, which NEUBACHER remembers, complained of alleged mistreatment of NEDIC's State Police men and other Yugoslavs who had been

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transferred to WIEN after the German retreat from the Balkans. The accusations were investigated and found without basis.

The BELGRADE police maintained an internment camp at SEMLIN which came to NEUBACHER's attention when he received the order to abandon the camp because it was on Croatian, not Serbian territory. NEUBACHER does not know of any other concentration camps used by the NEDIC regime.

(8) The Ustashes

(a) General Remarks

The Ustashes formed a kind of militia-type army of the Axis-sponsored Croatian government led by "poglovaik" (leader) Ante PAVLIC. PAVLIC came to Croatia from Italy and soon became the real dictator of Croatia. He was a great favorite of MUSCHL, the German Minister in ZAGREB.

For 12 to 15 years, the Ustasha men had been trained by the Italians to carry out terroristic assaults. Training camps were located in Italy (MANTUA(?)) and in Hungary. They boasted of having murdered King ALEXANDER of Yugoslavia. NEUBACHER says they would head any war criminal list. Their cruelty was notorious and they committed thousands of murders. The concentration camp at JASNOVAC was the scene of many of their crimes.

NEUBACHER was emphatically opposed to the Axis' pro-Ustasha policy, strongly supported by Italy into whose sphere of interest Croatia came in 1933. (Mare Nostrum policy). According to NEUBACHER, that pro-Ustasha policy resulted in the increase of the pro-Russian and therefore pro-Communist tendencies of the Serbs and even of some Croats. NEUBACHER's pronounced anti-Ustasha attitude made him their avowed enemy and they planned to assassinate him, he says.

Because the Ustashes were pro-Italian and nominally ardent Catholics, they enjoyed the valuable secret support of the Jesuit and Franciscan religious orders. It may be that as a result of that support the Ustashes set about converting the Orthodox Catholics to Roman Catholicism by force. Entire villages turned Catholic in order to save themselves from the Ustasha terror.

The bitterest enemies of the Ustashes were MIHAILOVICH and his Chetniks. LJOTIC's and NEDIC's aspirations and ideologies were of course less incompatible with those of the Ustashes. Relations between TITO and the Ustashes were very poor at first but became better, especially after the situation of Italy and Germany became worse. It became quite obvious to Ustasha members that the population, which hated them, would show them no mercy once they were left without a protector. NEUBACHER sneers that the common totalitarian ideology of the two groups and the similar manner in which they ruled by terror made it comparatively easy for the Ustasha rank and file to join TITO's group. The practice of going over to TITO increased in 1945. By that time Italy, the Ustashes' sponsor, had been knocked out of the war, and it became clear that Germany was soon to follow.

According to reports which reached NEUBACHER, Ustasha officers approached TITO's Hq in BELGRADE at the beginning of 1945 to initiate negotiations. Ante PAVLIC had tried to come to terms with the Western Allies since 1942 through the medium of MESTROVIC, the famous sculptor who was then in Switzerland. NEUBACHER heard that PAVLIC had even submitted a draft of a new, more democratic constitution with which he hoped to please the Western Allies. In order to accomplish his aim, PAVLIC also sent a special envoy to England.

(b) Mass Executions

LJOTIC's "Serbian Volunteer Corps" was on the move from Serbia towards Istria (see para. c.(6)) December 1944 or January 1945. While en route, 30 of its officers were captured by the Ustashes. In spite of the Wehrmacht officers' identity cards which the officers carried, Lt Col LUBURIC of the Ustashes issued the order that they be executed on the spot. As soon as the news of the executions

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reached NEUBACHER he exerted strong pressure upon RIBBENTROP for a stern note to be sent to Ante PAVELIC* (Croatia was officially considered to be a sovereign state). Furthermore the Germans demonstratively recalled their Minister KASCHER from ZAGREB.

Some weeks later Lt Col LUBURIC ordered his men to evict approximately 120 wounded Chetniks from a German hospital train. They were executed on the spot. According to NEUBACHER's estimates, Lt Col LUBURIC killed several hundreds of thousands of the Ustasha's opponents. Records concerning these mass murders should be available in the files of Obst Lt HARLING (see para b. (8)) or O/Bef Sudost.

(9) Dshafaer DEVA

Dshafaer DEVA was introduced to NEUBACHER by Obst von KOHOUTEK (see para G. (9)) in BILGARD, September 1943. DEVA, appr 40 years old, was an Albanian of Moslem faith. He came from the Kessovo district in Serbia and had studied in Albania. He was a convinced Albanian nationalist with strong anti-Communist feelings. He wore eye-glasses, and at first his general appearance suggested that of an average high school teacher.

After the defeat of Italy, DEVA organized the Albanian National Committee which proclaimed Albanian independence 14 Sep 43. The Committee formed a provisional government and DEVA sought to gain official German recognition through NEUBACHER. NEUBACHER stresses that they permitted free elections for representatives to the national parliament. The parliament appointed the regency council and formed a permanent government. DEVA served as Minister of the Interior under Prime Minister Redshap MITROVITZ in both the provisional and permanent governments. He regarded as his main task the wreaking of (revenge for bloodshed) against the Communists.

He represented the Kessovans (Albanians who stemmed from the Kessovo district in Serbia) in the new Albanian government. According to NEUBACHER the population of this district furnished the most politically active element in Albania. These men were strongly nationalistic and opposed any outside interference. They were therefore at that time anti-Italian. They were rather wealthy and as a result were decidedly anti-Communist. Next to the President of the Regency Council, Mehdi Bey FRASHERI, DEVA, and not Prime Minister MITROVITZ (also a Kessovan) was the most prominent man in Albania.

When Figli DIJO formed a new Albanian cabinet May-June 1944, DEVA resigned because of ill health. He travelled to WIEN for medical consultation and cure. During Summer 1944 DEVA became President of the "Kessovan Liga", an Albanian nationalist organization opposing Serbia and Montenegro. He regarded as his mission the organization of center of "Greater Albanian" nationalism in the Albanian Kessovan district in Serbia. In order to accomplish this task he had to dispose of the outmoded leadership of the DRAGU and BLY groups, the pro-Italian sentiments of which were uncommon in the Kessovan district. These leaders represented the old and backward Levantine mentality which tolerated the rule of tribal chiefs.

DEVA resolved to stay in the district after the anticipated German retreat in order to fight TITO. He was forced to drop that idea because the German authorities were unable to supply him with the needed equipment and supplies in time. As a result DEVA came to ZAGREB November 1944 and flew to WIEN in NEUBACHER's company. He participated in the formation of an Albanian National Committee in WIEN for KITZBUHNER together with members of NEUBACHER's main office. He attempted to reach Switzerland May 1945 and NEUBACHER understands he succeeded in doing so. Prior to his entry into Switzerland NEUBACHER and DEVA discussed plans under which the latter was to return to Albania by way of Southern Italy or Greece. On that occasion NEUBACHER said to DEVA, half in jest "Report to Gen SCOBIE with my best regards, and tamper with the Albanian case by way of Northern Greece."

*(The shooting of guerillas is not considered "mass murder", even when done by rival guerillas.)

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(10) Relations with the International Red Cross in Greece

While special envoy in ATHENS, NEUBACHER had to work in close connection with the Greek relief mission of the International Red Cross. NEUBACHER states that the collaboration was smooth and efficient as it was based on trust and mutual good will.

Chief of the mission (since September 1942) was the Swedish Minister at SOFIA, ALAR, who later became Swedish minister at CHUNGKING. His first assistant was Dr SANLSTROM, a Swede who had been a member of the international council at CAIRO. Other assistants included a Swedish consul general (name unknown), a cousin of President ROOSEVELT, and the Swiss von GLUZ. NEUBACHER cannot recall all the names and functions of the members of the mission.

NEUBACHER's contacts with ALAR and Dr SANLSTROM developed into a close friendship with these men and their families. This proved of value in carrying out the mission's work despite some handicaps caused by the infiltration of foreign agents.

It was to be expected that the British Secret Service would take some advantage of the relief mission in Greece, but activities of British agents became so conspicuous and reckless that the future of the entire work was jeopardized. Encouraged by the apparent immunity of the British agents, Soviet-sponsored ELAS agents began to follow their example, and several embarrassing incidents ensued, of which NEUBACHER remembers the following:

It was discovered by accident in December(?) 1942, that an IRC ambulance, unloaded in PIRAEUS harbor from the Swedish ship BALDRLAND or MONGABARA, carried ammunition and explosives, instead of the declared relief supplies. Another IRC ambulance which was involved in a road accident in the Isthmus of CORINTH also was found to carry explosives. One member of the mission, a Swedish archaeologist, drove the ambulances directly to the secret ELAS headquarters. Another member of the mission, a Swiss, did not even bother to conceal the fact that he was primarily interested in working for the British Intelligence. Ambulance drivers were particularly keen on helping the ELAS and black market operators.

NEUBACHER is convinced that neither ALAR nor Dr SANLSTROM, with whom he discussed these incidents, were involved. The alternatives in dealing with the problem were either to intervene ruthlessly at the expense of the success of the relief action, a solution which was favored by OKW, or to carry out routine counter-measures and take account of the security risks involved. NEUBACHER advocated the second method and succeeded in convincing the German government. He argued that the British Intelligence Service was so well organized that it could very well carry on even if it could no longer avail itself of the relief mission, while on the other hand, Germany was much more interested in the success of the relief action than the Allies.

(11) MACDONELL

(a) Preamble

In the beginning of 1944 Draja MIHAILOVICH's liaison officer brought NEUBACHER the first news of a US mission in MIHAILOVICH's camp. The mission presumably consisted of approximately four or five members of the US forces, including W/T operators. It was led by Col MACDONELL, Professor of Balkan Science at BOSTON University(?).

According to NEUBACHER, his past, political outlook, and mission at that time were quite well known to Col MACDONELL. His opinions of NEUBACHER were always definite. MACDONELL apparently respected NEUBACHER. He even said once that the men who shaped world policy would like to see NEUBACHER back a different horse and jump on another band wagon.

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The positive knowledge which MACDOWELL had of NEUBACHER and the fact that the American colonel appeared to have a good knowledge of L Asia finally led NEUBACHER to the conclusion that MACDOWELL must be identical with the one-time US military attache in BUCHAREST, Col RATAY. NEUBACHER had been on fairly intimate terms with RATAY, 1940-1941. NEUBACHER mentioned, incidentally, that before the US entry into the war Col RATAY had invited him to visit the US after the war. The visit was to have provided them the opportunity to discuss problems of mutual interest in a leisurely fashion. (After the interrogation NEUBACHER received information from a visiting interrogator that RATAY and MACDOWELL were not identical.)

(b) Contacts

Near the middle of 1944 Rudi STAERKER (see para 5.(13)) reported to NEUBACHER the details of a talk he had had with MACDOWELL at MIHAILOVICH's Hq. MACDOWELL pointed out, among other things, that Germany was doomed to lose the war and that President ROOSEVELT was absolutely opposed to any deal with the then existing government of Germany. MACDOWELL seemed rather eager to have a talk with NEUBACHER and declared himself ready to meet him at any place the latter might suggest.

NEUBACHER became involved in a long struggle to get permission for the proposed meeting. He applied personally and by wire to HITLER's headquarters. At first RIBBENTROP was opposed but he later changed his mind. He even used his influence with HITLER in support of NEUBACHER's last compromise suggestion. According to this suggestion, NEUBACHER proposed to conduct discussions with MACDOWELL through an intermediary. He finally sent Rudi STAERKER as his personal representative to meet MACDOWELL at MIHAILOVICH's Hq. STAERKER took notes (see Annex IV) during the meeting and MACDOWELL authorized him to submit the following outline to NEUBACHER.

1. MACDOWELL wants to speak to NEUBACHER and is even prepared to go to BELGRADE for that purpose.
2. Nothing can be discussed which might be construed as contrary to the common interests of all the Allies.
3. He is authorized to discuss Balkan problems.
4. He is ready to talk over any other questions in order to refer them to his government.
5. He is also authorized to use an American plane attached to his mission to send the German participant abroad for further discussions. He is even authorized to send him to the US.
6. A special American plenipotentiary may also come over to participate in a very important conversation.
7. He considers NEUBACHER an experienced man and a German realist (praktischen Deutschen). He considers him therefore the man best suited to know how to act at a time when the war seems to be coming to an end."

NEUBACHER submitted these points to his superiors and requested permission to start the talks. RIBBENTROP refused flatly. NEUBACHER heard later that MACDOWELL remarked, "NEUBACHER does not wish to speak to me but sooner or later he will be obliged to do so, regardless of his wishes."

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(c) MACDOWELL's Policy

his, namely:

As far as NEUBACHER knows, MACDOWELL's policy ran parallel to

1. To prevent Soviet invasion of the Balkans
2. To oppose TITO and aid the Serbian nationalist groups
3. To support MIHALOVICH's idea of abandoning the two-front struggle. He considered it wiser to concentrate all effort on a one-front fight against TITO, rather than to squander energy fighting the Germans who were already destined to leave the country.

NEUBACHER always kept abreast of MACDOWELL's actions. He knew, for instance, that MACDOWELL was very interested in the movements of the Red Army after its entry into BULGARIA. During the last stages of the battle for Serbia, MACDOWELL advised MIHALOVICH to get as much equipment as possible from the Germans. MACDOWELL himself was unable to support the Chetniks with equipment after the TEHRAN conference. His very presence had nevertheless, according to NEUBACHER, been manna in the wilderness for the morale of all Serbian collaborationist groups (MIHALOVICH, LJOTIC and NEDIC).

(d) Conclusions

MACDOWELL left MIHALOVICH's HQ for the US at the end of 1944. He expected an early return to the Balkans, possibly to Istria or Slovenia. Some of his W/T operators remained with MIHALOVICH for some time afterwards.

MACDOWELL had shared all the trials and tribulations of the Chetniks when they were pursued by TITO's overwhelmingly superior forces in September-October 1944. He was the last hope of the Serbian nationalist front.

Balkan affairs were the only matters touched during all the negotiations between MACDOWELL and NEUBACHER. MACDOWELL has always been regarded in the Balkans as the Balkan envoy of the US.

It may be that NEUBACHER is still withholding some information concerning his relations with MACDOWELL, of whom he seems to be more than fond. This impression is caused by the fact that NEUBACHER, who usually speaks too freely and seems to have a need for talking, becomes very cautious and weighs each word whenever he is confronted by any question relating to MACDOWELL.

(12) NEUBACHER's Contacts with British Circles

(a) Before the War

In his capacity as specialist on small truck farming and garden homes and as leader of the Oesterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund, an inter-party organization favoring the Anschluss, NEUBACHER came in to close contact with Sir Eric PHILIPS and Robert HADLOW, both of the British Legation in VIENNA, during the years 1932-1934.

The Member of Parliament, SIR LESLIE BURNHAM, visited NEUBACHER in 1928 as a representative of the Royal Society for International Affairs and discussed the Anschluss problem.

Sir Walter LAYTON, editor of the Economist and the News Chronicle, discussed Central European economic problems with NEUBACHER during the years 1932-1934. Both Sir Walter and Lady LAYTON showed great interest in his achievements in the field of garden homes. In 1935 and 1936 LAYTON wrote favora-

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bly of NEUBACHER in the News Chronicle.

Beginning of 1934, NEUBACHER met the former Colonial Secretary and later Secretary of the Home Office, AMERY, and discussed with him at length the new German National Socialism and the fascist repression of the Social Democrats in WEIMAR, February 1934.

In 1939 NEUBACHER visited the Duke of MONTROSE and several political editors of The Times.

(b) During the War

Some contacts existed between the Abwehr and the British Secret Service in Greece, NEUBACHER claims, because the British were greatly concerned over the spread of Communism in that country. NEUBACHER remembers only one instance when the two intelligence agencies met while he was in office.

During the winter 1942-1943 O/Bef Sued Ost approached NEUBACHER with the request that the latter secure permission from BERLIN for an Anglo-German conference for a discussion of the communist threat. HITLER and RIBBENTROP consented, and the meeting took place in ATHENS. The British were represented by a General Staff officer of field grade and two other officers. Rudi STILRAER (see para b. (13)), accompanied by Dr LOOS, chief of GFP with O/Bef Sued Ost, acted as NEUBACHER's emissary. During the conference the British representative emphasized the fact that he acted only for British military circles, but did not represent H M Government. Mutual views were exchanged, but no definite results were reached.

British intelligence made another attempt to get in touch with the German Intelligence Service when the German retreat from Greece seemed imminent. It proposed a German surrender or a retreat so synchronized that the British could follow up with immediate occupation of the vacated territory, apparently, NEUBACHER thinks, in order to check at any cost the rise of ELIAS into power.

Similar attempts were made to contact the Germans in Albania, where they were to consider themselves prisoners of war, but would not have to lay down their arms but would instead take over police functions in the country. Under no circumstances were weapons to be given to the Albanians. The Germans were eventually to be repatriated.

In September 1944 NEUBACHER was approached by TSIRONAKOS of the RHALLYS Government and his Swedish friends of the International Red Cross, who suggested that he establish contact with the British General, SCOBIE, in order to discuss problems of the German retreat. The suggestion seemed to come from the British general, but NEUBACHER did not take any steps in that direction after RIBBENTROP, apparently on direct orders from HITLER, had forbidden any action on these feelers.

NEUBACHER does not recall any other cases of important contacts with the British.

(13) Relations with RIBBENTROP and the Auswaertige Amt

The picture which NEUBACHER paints of Foreign Minister Joachim von RIBBENTROP is not exactly flattering. He describes him as mean, arrogant conceited, and jealous of his position; a man totally without charm and without any flair for foreign relations, who greatly preferred to discuss strategic and military matters of which he knew as little as of diplomatic problems.

RIBBENTROP came to power not because of any outstanding qualifications, but because of the circumstances which surrounded the Nazi Party's rise to power. At that time the party had very few educated men who spoke any foreign languages passably well, or had some foreign connections and could cut a half-way

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Inter-party rivalries came to the fore immediately. BOHLE, Gauleiter of Gau Ausland, and BORMANN were opposed to the new appointment. They took advantage of the situation by trying to exclude NEUBACHER from any important field in foreign affairs. BOHLE feared for his "back-door" influence in foreign matters, while BORMANN was motivated by his notorious hatred of Austrians in general and any friend of KILTBERRUNNER's in particular. RIBBENTROP did everything he could to uphold his appointee in face of the opposition because he did not want his two principal foes to score a success in his own field. Finally, a compromise was reached through mediation of Dr TOBT, a close friend of NEUBACHER's whom he highly respected as one of the German key-men in the Balkans. NEUBACHER remained at his post as special emissary, but now as a high-ranking permanent official of the Auswaertige Amt, while the post of Minister to Rumania was given to Freiherr von MULLINGEN, an old party man. The "great" BORMANN never forgot this defeat, but the "losser" BOHLE did his best to reach a closer understanding with NEUBACHER, who avoided him consistently.

RIBBENTROP came out second best in another fight over NEUBACHER (summer 1941) when GOERING claimed him for the post of key-executive in the Caucasian oil-fields for the Four Year Plan. The appointment was approved over RIBBENTROP's objections, and the only reason why NEUBACHER remained with the Auswaertige Amt was the failure of the German Army to gain a permanent foothold in the Caucasus.

NEUBACHER's success in curbing the economic plight and famine in Greece (1942) increased his prestige with the Auswaertige Amt, especially with RIBBENTROP who considered him his personal discovery or, at least, a product of his own office, and secured for him a high award.

Soon afterwards it became obvious to NEUBACHER that he had reached the climax of his career in the Auswaertige Amt, and that RIBBENTROP's attitude was changing as soon as he realized that NEUBACHER's popularity had grown beyond the limits of the Auswaertige Amt, and that he had achieved some fame of his own for which RIBBENTROP was not given credit. Apparently RIBBENTROP was afraid that this fame might spread further, overshadow his own, and eventually lead to his downfall. NEUBACHER states that by that time he had become too big to be dismissed without cause and, in fact, had to be given more and bigger assignments because of his popularity with the highest party officials and because the Auswaertige Amt needed able men as much as ever.

When the OKW reorganized the command in SE Europe and established a unified command (Heeres Gruppe F) under Gen Feld Marschall von WELCHS as O/Bef Sued Ost, RIBBENTROP had to coordinate his offices in the affected areas accordingly, and had no choice but to appoint NEUBACHER special envoy and plenipotentiary (Sonder Bevollmaechtigteter des Auswaertigen Amtes fuer den Sued Osten) in Autumn 1943. The new sphere of activities coincided with the territory under von WELCHS' command and included Serbia, Greece, Albania, Montenegro and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. Croatia remained, for personal reasons, the untouchable realm of Minister KLUGE, although it was clear from the outset that KLUGE's extreme pro-Croat policy would cause great difficulties to NEUBACHER's plans which were diametrically opposed.

RIBBENTROP's efforts to undermine NEUBACHER's popularity led to a silent but persistent struggle which was carried on at the expense of German manipulations in NEUBACHER's zone. A confidential directive from the Foreign Minister requested the press and radio not to report on NEUBACHER's work. Suggestions by NEUBACHER could be expected to meet with RIBBENTROP's opposition, as did his plans to establish closer contact with Col MACDONELL of the US Army, or to take action when the opportunity offered itself to get in touch with the British in Greece. In the last named case, RIBBENTROP's anti-British bias may also have had some influence on his refusal. Nor did RIBBENTROP stop within the limits of his own

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KALTENBRUNNER's relations with NEUBACHER in the field of intelligence may be found in b.(2) and b. (15).

(b) KALTENBRUNNER's Intended Contacts with the Allies

NEUBACHER thinks that KALTENBRUNNER's intentions to win over the Western Allies for a common fight against the USSR existed as early as 1943. It is possible that KALTENBRUNNER's Swiss contacts originated because of these intentions. Later these contacts had also to serve other purposes ("saving of Austria") but were discontinued by order of HIMMLER (see para b. (3)). NEUBACHER gathered from his talks with KALTENBRUNNER that the latter hoped to use SCHILLER for the purpose of strengthening the contacts in Switzerland. He understood that KALTENBRUNNER put out some feelers in Sweden. He remembers only that there were hints and even a faint hope that an indirect contact with US presidential candidate DEWEY might be effected. He knows no further details.

NEUBACHER thinks that KALTENBRUNNER regarded him as the most suitable man to establish better Allied-German relations for the purpose of a common fight against the USSR. KALTENBRUNNER based his belief on NEUBACHER's good relations with pro-Western Allies groups in the Balkans. NEUBACHER had already established some contact with the British and Americans in the Balkans even though it was poor and indirect. There were no tangible results.

NEUBACHER denies having sent any one of his Balkan friends on any mission to Switzerland. He says that as soon as the German plight became obvious he advised the emigres in the Grand Hotel (see para c. (7) and Annex V) to flee to safety to Switzerland. Some acted on his advice but others did not wish to, or were not in a position to do so.

CAVRILLO, the patriarch of the Serbian autokefalean (independent) church, and NIKOLAI the archbishop of that church decided independently of NEUBACHER to leave Switzerland, April 1945. CAVRILLO was to have gone to England and NIKOLAI to the US. They did not follow their plans. NEUBACHER does not know why.

NEUBACHER remembers one instance of KALTENBRUNNER's endeavours to get in touch with the Western Allies. The Polish Count, POTOCKI who was on his way to Switzerland with his mother had been approached by KALTENBRUNNER in March or April 1945. POTOCKI came from LANOUT and may be the brother of the former Polish Ambassador in WASHINGTON. (It is possible that he, himself, was the ambassador, but this is considered improbable.) KALTENBRUNNER discussed with him the necessity of persuading the Western Allies that there was a danger of a sovietization of W Europe and spoke of its consequences and possible remedies. NEUBACHER met POTOCKI and KALTENBRUNNER in the Oesterreichischer Hof in SALZBURG but he does not remember many details. He does recall that he told POTOCKI to contact immediately the British Ambassador in BERN, who was known to NEUBACHER as a convinced anti-Communist.

(c) "Save Austria" Activities

NEUBACHER decided to start convincing KALTENBRUNNER of Germany's inevitable fate as soon as the results of the YALTA conference became known. At first he was afraid of speaking too freely to KALTENBRUNNER since the latter was still under HIMMLER's influence and still believed that HITLER's career would parallel that of FREDERICK the Great and end in eventual triumph. However, KALTENBRUNNER's realistic outlook, common sense, and affection for Austria made the task of convincing him rather easy, NEUBACHER states. He agreed with NEUBACHER that everything should be done to save Austria from utter destruction, and moreover from sovietization. Since HIMMLER had appointed KALTENBRUNNER Ueber Reichsverteidigungs Komisar for Austria, it was much easier to execute the plans upon which he and NEUBACHER agreed.

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In addition to the questions previously discussed (see para b. (21)), NEUBACHER suggested that KALTENBRUNNER order Gen Obst LOHR, CG of Heeresgruppe E, to move with his army from Croatia to Carinthia and as far into Austria as possible. This was to be done in order to forestall any Communist uprising and in order to surrender to the Western Allies as an "Austrian" army. The army might then be permitted to remain temporarily armed, NEUBACHER thought, so that it could keep "order" in the country under Western Allied rule.

NEUBACHER suggested to KALTENBRUNNER that Volkssturm members of Austrian origin be recalled to Austrian territory. He further suggested that any policy which might exist for demolitions within Austrian territory should be abandoned. In other words, all necessary steps were to be taken to prevent interior subversive elements from utilizing the transition phase to their own advantage. NEUBACHER held also that neither the Volkssturm nor LOHR's units should under any circumstances oppose any occupation armies, not even the Russians. KALTENBRUNNER entirely agreed with NEUBACHER and as far as NEUBACHER knows issued the appropriate orders. However, NEUBACHER heard that LOHR had been captured by TITO. (Later he apparently reached Austria and was arrested near LUDWIGSBURG). NEUBACHER regards LOHR as one of the most efficient and able German generals of Austrian origin. LOHR had succeeded von MICHS in the "Suedslavischer Restraum". When NEUBACHER met LOHR for the last time in SALONIKA, Summer 1944, the latter was sufficiently sobered to regard the situation as hopeless.

Some time after Easter (NEUBACHER thinks it was appr 15 Apr 45) KALTENBRUNNER summoned NEUBACHER to attend a meeting at Feursteinstr 16, in GmundlN. Present at the meeting in addition to KALTENBRUNNER were W. NLOCK, GOITSCHE MUEHLHANN, and an Austrian who was unknown to NEUBACHER. NEUBACHER does not know any details concerning GOITSCHE except that he was a S German and close to KALTENBRUNNER. He may have worked in KALTENBRUNNER's office. MUEHLHANN was a renowned Austrian historian and connoisseur of art. He was definitely not a member of Amt VI although he had been an honorary Standf (Lhrenfuhrer) since 1938. The man unknown to NEUBACHER was dark-haired, round-faced and smaller than GOITSCHE. GLAISL-HORSTLMAN (a close friend of NEUBACHER's) and LOHR were definitely not present at this meeting, and so far as NEUBACHER remembers, neither was ROETTL.

Contrary to KALTENBRUNNER's wish, NEUBACHER at first refrained from speaking frankly of the general and particularly the Austrian situation because of the presence of the strange Austrian. However, he did so as soon as KALTENBRUNNER assured him of the stranger's trustworthiness. This was the first time that NEUBACHER told a larger gathering of his opinion on the imminent downfall of the 3rd Reich. The meeting settled no conclusive issues or any issues worth mentioning. As NEUBACHER stresses, it should be kept in mind that a certain uneasiness prevailed over all minds at that time. The non-stop bombings and the rapid course of developments rendered any sober and mature workings of the mind impossible. NEUBACHER claims that this is the reason why he is unable to remember exact dates and facts of that period.

A second meeting took place some days later (before NEUBACHER's first meeting with von WINTER in KOLNIGSSEE) in ALT-AUSSEE. KALTENBRUNNER, NEUBACHER, NLOCK, GOITSCHE, MUEHLHANN and perhaps the aforementioned unknown Austrian were present. Again much was said and no conclusive settlement of issues was achieved.

When questioned, NEUBACHER said that he did not remember any special meeting in FUSCHL. He vaguely remembers having stopped in FUSCHL once while he was on his way either to or from SALZBURG or GmundlN. (He stopped at FUSCHL at that time because another car in his party had a flat tire). While waiting he met some people of the Auswaertige Amt and possibly KALTENBRUNNER. Nothing of importance occurred.

(d) Austria's Future

NEUBACHER was, prior to 1938, the leader of the inter-party organization, Oestreich Deutscher Volksbund. (LOEBEL held a similar position

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(17) Franz von NEUHUSEN and VUKOLVIO

Franz von NEUHUSEN (C.I. card 43836-7) had been chief of the military government in Serbia (Militar Verwaltungs Chef in Serbien) since 1944. He was also the German Government's special representative to the iron ore industry in the Balkans. He had previously served as the plenipotentiary of the German government for the Four Year Plan for Serbia (General Bevollmachtigter des Vier Jahre Planes fuer Serbien). In approximately 1936 he had been the manager of a travel agency in BERLIN, and chief of the foreign branch of the NSDAP. (Landesgruppen Leiter der Auslands Organisation in Jugoslawien).

Before settling in BELGRADE he had been sentenced in absentia to four years hard labor for embezzlement for funds of Bulgaria. That sentence was revised when NEUHUSEN became a prominent figure. Even before the war NEUHUSEN had been a close friend of GOERING. The magnitude of his corruption was notorious throughout Germany. He abused his power to enrich himself and was unscrupulous in all his dealings. However, because of GOERING's protection it was impossible to lay hands on him. His behavior lowered German prestige in the Balkans, NEUBACHER states.

According to NEUBACHER, neither HITLER nor RIBBENTROP dared to incur the wrath of the "almighty" GOERING by denouncing NEUHUSEN's behavior to HITLER. NEUBACHER, with KALTENBRUNNER's full cooperation, did his best to bring about NEUHUSEN's downfall. Finally in August 1944 HITLER had NEUHUSEN arrested in the Banat and put into jail in BERLIN. GOERING's repeated attempts to liberate NEUHUSEN led to several clashes with KALTENBRUNNER. To save GOERING's personal prestige and "for reasons of state" NEUHUSEN was freed despite the vigorous protests of KALTENBRUNNER, von WILCHS (O/Jef sued Ost), and NEUBACHER. It is interesting to note that with the exception of GOERING NEUHUSEN's sole support was the Gestapo. NEUHUSEN's arrest had created quite a sensation in BERLIN and in SE Europe, and his release left a demoralizing impression. He departed for ST. GILGEN, Austria to recover. NEUHUSEN was known to have been in contact with the Communist Party through his friend, Dr VUKOLVIO.

VUKOLVIO had bribed his way out of Serbia and escaped, using an American uniform and an Allied plane. He was able to board the plane through a ruse made possible because Allied fliers who had been hidden by MIHAILOVICH were from time to time gathered in groups and flown back to their countries. VUKOLVIO took advantage of such a flight. The plane took off from MIHAILOVICH's camp despite his specific orders to the contrary. The craft was presumably bound for Britain but actually headed toward Italy.

NEUBACHER thinks that VUKOLVIO left Serbia to embezzle some fund and that he participated in all of NEUHUSEN's shady dealings. VUKOLVIO endorsed NEUHUSEN's bills and notes.

According to MCLEOVIC, VUKOLVIO has been a very active Communist since the 1930s and was arrested before the war for disseminating communist propaganda.

According to NEUBACHER the following persons were involved in NEUHUSEN's criminal activities in Serbia,

- (a) Mil Verwaltungs Oberrat GRIG
- (b) Mil Verwaltungs Oberrat REISER
- (c) O/Inspektor BLINZ
- (d) A certain MULLERMAN (not the same person as MULLERMAN in part c. (14))
- (e) A certain WILCOCHULTZ

All of these men either lived in BELGRADE or elsewhere in Serbia or had Serbian connections.

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UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER
APO 757

CI RE-INTERROGATION REPORT (CI-RIR) No 4

SECRET
Auth: C. H. H. C.
Init: J. H. H. C.
Date: 1 Jan 46

SUBJECT: Dr Hermann NEUBACHER

Dr Hermann NEUBACHER was Buergermeister of WIEN, 1938-40, and a special envoy of the German Foreign Office in the Balkans, 1941-45.

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1. REFERENCES

USFET MIS Center CI-IIR/36 dtd 29 Jan 46
State Dept Special Interrogation Mission Report, dtd 15 Oct 45.

2. REASON FOR REPORT

The CI War Room questionnaire on Dr Hermann NEUBACHER (ref: PF 603013, dtd 31 Aug 45) and CI War Room general questionnaire on political affairs in the Balkans reached this center after interrogation for CI - IIR/36 had already been completed.

3. REPORT

a. MACER

Since Croatia was excluded from NEUBACHER's official sphere of activity, NEUBACHER did not know Dr MACER personally. NEUBACHER knows that MACER rejected the suggestion of VLESSENMAYER, acting for the German Government on the eve of the invasion of Yugoslavia, that he form a new Croatian government. VLESSENMAYER may be able to furnish additional details.

When Ante PAVELIC assumed power in Croatia, MACER and other Croat Peasant Party leaders lost all interest in German policy in Croatia, according to NEUBACHER. From then on the German Foreign Office considered further relations with Croat peasant leaders unfeasible. MACER was arrested at the start of the PAVELIC regime and interned, first in a concentration camp and later under a strong Ustasha guard, which precluded outside contacts. NEUBACHER heard that only after PAVELIC's downfall became imminent were Croat Peasant Party leaders able to communicate with MACER.

b. The Ustasha

NEUBACHER's knowledge of the Ustasha is limited. His attitude toward that movement, he claims, was always negative.

The Ustasha, a Croat terrorist organization formed shortly after World War I, was backed by Italy and Hungary. Politically it sought an independent Croatia and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia; accordingly, it was anti-Serb and anti-Orthodox. NEUBACHER estimates its maximum strength at 100,000 armed men, trained in terroristic activities in Hungary and Italy. After the German occupation of Croatia, the responsibility for arming and equipping the Ustasha fell to the Waffen SS (O/Gruf BERGER).

The Ustasha and PAVELIC's Poglovnik had the support of most Croats, according to NEUBACHER, who considers it an oversimplification to say the movement was backed by the Yugoslav Catholics. Some supporters were numbered among lower-level clergy in Croatia, and NEUBACHER thinks the Ustasha enjoyed the unofficial support of some members of the Jesuit and Franciscan orders, but definitely not that of the Vatican or of higher Roman Catholic clergy in Yugoslavia. The Viennese Catholic newspaper, Reichs Post, was always "friendly" to the Ustasha.

Official German policy toward the Ustasha was the responsibility of the Foreign Office, but after the German occupation of Yugoslavia it was actually directed by KASCH, the German Minister. Although usually favorable to the Ustasha, it always followed the lines of general German policy in the Balkans. NEUBACHER states that the pro-Ustasha policy was based partly on KASCH's fondness and high esteem for PAVELIC and partly on HITLER's anti-Serb complex. Under these circumstances, NEUBACHER's endeavors to show the danger of the pro-Ustasha policy to Germany's position in the Balkans were fruitless.

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NEUBACHER finds it difficult to provide an estimate of the number of Serbs massacred by the Ustasha, particularly within given periods. The Serbs have charged the Ustasha with murdering a million Orthodox Serbs, including infants and elderly persons, and the Ustasha itself boasted of the same figure. Official German circles placed the toll of Serb victims of the Ustasha at 100,000. "Outside and impartial" sources estimated the number at 500,000 to 1,000,000. NEUBACHER's own belief is that from the start of the German occupation until the retreat, six to seven hundred thousand were killed.

The Ustasha concentration camp at JASNOVAC, commanded by Colonel LUBURIC, was the scene of two to three hundred thousand killings. LUBURIC himself was said to have murdered 10,000 Serbs. Murders also took place in other camps and prisons, and frequently took the form of Ustasha raids on entire villages of Orthodox Serbs. Two other Ustashi gained notoriety for their ruthless murders of Serbs, according to NEUBACHER: KVATERNIK, Jr, and LONIC (fnu). It is PAVELIC who bears the main responsibility for the Serb extermination program, NEUBACHER charges. PAVELIC's policy toward the Orthodox Serbs, as outlined to close collaborators, was for a third to be killed, a third forced to emigrate, and the remainder Catholicized. Neither the Vatican nor the high clergy of Yugoslavia were implicated in the PAVELIC plan, according to NEUBACHER, but some of the lower-level Catholic clergy actively supported the program.

NEUBACHER dismisses assertions of the mass murder of Croats by Serbs as "out of the question". The Serbian nationalist movements were concerned only with fighting the Germans and later TITO's partisans, without regard to religious or national distinctions. The remainder of the Serbian populace was unarmed. A few thousand Croats were killed by Serbs, but only in self-defense, NEUBACHER believes. Further information on the Ustasha massacres can be furnished by KASCHE, Gen GLAISE-HORSTENAU, SS Gruf KAMMERMEIER, and NEDIC.

KASCHE was well-informed on the massacres and condoned them. Such was also the attitude of RIBBENTROP. HITLER, who was well-acquainted with the Ustasha record, took no steps to halt or moderate their program. NEUBACHER attributes this stand to the Fuehrer's anti-Serb complex.

Infrequent letters from the German Foreign Office to KASCHE asked that a brake be put on Ustasha cruelties, but no one failed to see that those letters were but mere formalities. NEUBACHER styles himself a consistent opponent of the Ustasha and claims he won over KALTENBRUNNER to the same view. RIBBENTROP's only answer to NEUBACHER's and KALTENBRUNNER's protestations was to recall KASCHE formally for a few weeks.

STAERKER, (see CI - IIR/36), who was listed by the Ustasha as first among its enemies, narrowly escaped death at the hands of the Ustasha.

c. Relations with Church Leaders

(1) GAVRILLO and NIKOLAI

GAVRILLO, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, was interned in a monastery in the Banat with Archbishop NIKOLAI immediately after Yugoslavia's defeat. The Germans regarded GAVRILLO as a powerful foe of Germany and a warmonger. As head of the Serbian church, GAVRILLO remained outside politics, but was a staunch Yugoslav patriot.

NIKOLAI, born in KOLASIN (Montenegro), was a typical theologian and fanatically religious. NEUBACHER believes he had spent many years in ISTANBUL and had made a name for himself in Turkey, the US, and England as a theologian and philosopher. At first his political sympathies were with MIHAILOVIC, but he later shifted to LJOTIC's Zbor movement.

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Both leaders regarded themselves as Christians first and Serbs second. They sympathized with the Western Allies, while domestically their views paralleled those of MIHAILOVIC, NEDIC, and LJOTIC. GAVRILO exerted strong influence not only in the Balkans but in other Orthodox countries, including Russia. He is decidedly anti-Communist, according to NEUBACHER.

NEUBACHER states that relations between the two clerics were not too close, a situation frequently exploited by certain of their followers. NEUBACHER realized soon after arriving in BELGRADE (Autumn 1943) that the two church leaders might be useful to his policy, and he therefore supported NEDIC's request for their release. But all NEUBACHER's efforts to free GAVRILO and NIKOLAI were without avail, probably because of RIBBENTROP's (rather than HITLER's) negative attitude.

NEDIC's attitude toward GAVRILO and NIKOLAI cooled as their sympathies for MIHAILOV became more and more evident, thus handicapping NEUBACHER's endeavors to free the leaders, who were regarded as increasingly anti-German.

After the German retreat from Rumania (August 1944), GAVRILO and NIKOLAI were moved to a jail in WIEN and later to DACHAU, without NEUBACHER's knowledge. In December 1944 KALTENBERGER, who was also unaware of this action, had the clerics transferred, at NEUBACHER's request, to SCHLIESSEL (Bavaria). There they lived in a private home, remaining under SD guard. Later, the two were sent to WIEN (Hotels Imperial and Bristol) and freed. RIBBENTROP agreed to this only after KALTENBERGER vouched for the two leaders.

In the meantime the Chetniks of POPDJUIC and JEDJIEVIC and Serbian volunteers (LJOTIC) in Istria had sought permission for the leaders of their church to visit Serbia. NEUBACHER persuaded GAVRILO and NIKOLAI to make the trip, and, with difficulty, obtained HITLER's permission. GAVRILO and NIKOLAI confined their visit to purely religious activities.

(2) STEPINAC

Relations between the Germans and high Roman Catholic clergy in Yugoslavia were practically non-existent, according to NEUBACHER. Neither KASCHER nor the Roman Catholic Archbishop of ZAGREB, STEPINAC, had any desire to contact each other. STEPINAC remained completely aloof from politics throughout the occupation.

(3) DAMASKINOS

NEUBACHER characterizes DAMASKINOS, the "uncrowned King of Greece", as a man of striking appearance, highly intelligent, a prominent theologian, and politically astute. DAMASKINOS, a consistent Anglophile, was on good terms with only two Germans, NEUBACHER and von ALTENBURG, the German Minister, basing these relationships solely on personal esteem. The Metropolitan's initial skepticism over NEUBACHER's relief mission later changed to vigorous support.

DAMASKINOS never mentioned King GEORGE of Greece in conversations with NEUBACHER, but the latter got the impression that the Metropolitan was not overly fond of the monarch. All the Greek resistance movements, including the EAM, stood in the good graces of DAMASKINOS. Considering himself "the father of all Greeks", DAMASKINOS never took an open anti-Communist stand. TSIRONIKOS and other Greek politicians revealed to NEUBACHER, however, that the Metropolitan provided financial support for the EAM.

Throughout the occupation DAMASKINOS maintained contact with both the Greek government-in-exile and the British. When this became openly apparent, the BdS, BLUM, had SD guards posted at DAMASKINOS' ATHENS apartment, but NEUBACHER intervened to prevent this and more drastic steps contemplated by BLUM.

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o. GOEBBELS and the Geneva Convention

KALTENBRUNNER told NEUBACHER at the end of 1944 that he was taking steps to thwart GOEBBELS' attempt to convince HITLER that Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention. It was already known that GOEBBELS had broadcast a veiled suggestion to the German people to kill grounded Allied airmen, and that HIMMLER had issued a secret order forbidding police interference with civilian actions against Allied fliers. The latter order may have represented a compromise between the GOEBBELS and KALTENBRUNNER points of view, according to NEUBACHER.

r. Rumanian Oil in Africa

A confidential report received by NEUBACHER in Spring 1943 alleged that Rumanian oil barges were putting in at a minor Bulgarian port (NEUBACHER does not recall the name) and transferring their cargo to southbound trains, evidently connecting with British tankers traveling to Africa. An investigation launched by NEUBACHER revealed that the cargo consisted of Rumanian oil in drums bearing the markings of the "Wehrmacht Mission in Rumania", which was named as consignee. The cargo, it was learned, was consigned to a non-existent "Wehrmacht Mission in Finland". Rumanian authorities protested, claiming the honor of the Rumanian navy had been violated. The serious repercussions were quelled only after numerous conferences between NEUBACHER and Rumanian officials.

In following up the incident, NEUBACHER discovered that through the efforts of British Intelligence at least 4,000 tons of valuable lubricants had been sent to British forces in Africa from Rumania, via Turkey, since 1942.

s. Execution of Allied Personnel with Partisans

In a German parachute raid on TITO's HQ at JAJCE (Bosnia) in 1944, a number of uniformed British and American newspaper correspondents were captured. Lt d R RITTER, Legations Rat and Foreign Office liaison officer with von WEICHS' HQ, called NEUBACHER's attention to HITLER's order that Allied personnel captured with partisan units were to be executed, and would therefore be turned over to the Gestapo immediately upon their apprehension.

Thereupon NEUBACHER telegraphed a warning to KALTENBRUNNER that the execution of the newspapermen would bring reprisals. KALTENBRUNNER immediately replied that the prisoners were not to be executed.

t. German Shipping in the Mediterranean

BESI, an official of the Levante line, which handled German oil transports in the Mediterranean, was one of two brothers with whom the Germans in BUCHAREST had dealings. The other was honorary German consul in BRAILIA and a prominent wholesale merchant.

In 1940, after the Italian attack on Greece, the Italian Minister in BUCHAREST expressed distrust of the Levante official and asked NEUBACHER to cease using the Levante line for Italy-bound cargoes, at the same time proposing that RHEEDER, reputedly an avid Italian Fascist, replace BESI in handling this shipping. NEUBACHER felt obliged to comply with the request, realizing that the German Foreign Office would overrule his objections in any case.

Several months later the Italian Minister requested that RHEEDER be dropped. RHEEDER, the Italians had learned, had been selling large quantities of oil to the British.

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A b s c h r i f t !

Edmund Glaise-Horstenau

II.

DER PARTISANENKRIEG IN KROATIEN

Der Partisanenkrieg im Suedosten und insbesondere in Kroatien unterschied sich mehrfach stark von dem in Russland und Polen. Eher glich er in seinen aeusseren Formen den Aufstaenden in Frankreich und Italien. Was aber seine besondere Eigenart ausmachte: er war zugleich Buerger- und Bruderkrieg, blutig, wie es nur Bruderkriege sein koennen.

Fuer die urspruenglich sehr schwache deutsche Besatzung - ueber ein Gebiet von 50.000 KM² waren zuerst 9 ausserordentlich schwache Landsturmataillone verteilt, indess im gleich grossen italienischen Besatzungsgebiet stets mindestens ebenso viele Divisionen standen - ergab sich gegenueber den Aufstaendischen nach dem noch mit der jugoslawischen Heeresleitung geschlossenen Waffenstillstand zu-naechst die voelkerrechtliche Frage: Franc tireur oder regulaeerer Soldat? Da der Aufstand zuerst nicht gegen die deutschen Truppen gerichtet war, sondern als Kampf zwischen Kroaten und Serben ausbrach, gipfelten meine Vorschlaege nach oben zu-naechst in dem dringenden Ratschlag, die deutschen Truppen dieser nationalen Auseinandersetzung, so lange es ging, fernzuhalten. Ich gab mich dabei der Hoffnung hin, dass es doch noch gelingen koennte, die kroatisch-serbische Frage im Geiste der nationalen Gleichberechtigung unter deutscher Patronanz besser zu loesen, als es im Jugoslawien der Karageorgewitsche glueckte, und damit, wie immer der Krieg ausgehen moechte, wenigstens einen Beitrag fuer die kuenftige europaeische Ordnung zu liefern. So sehr sich im Raume die Sachen auch da stiessen, war doch ein erheblicher Teil der kroatischen Nation, die ehemalige Bauernpartei, einem Mitwirken

1/Unter "Kroatien" ist hier entsprechend der von Deutschland inaugurierten staetlichen Loesung die Gesamtheit der ehemals habsburgischen Laender Kroatien, Slavonien, Dalmatien, Bosnien und die Herzegowina zu verstehen. Es gab in diesem 100.000 KM² grossen Raum 3 Mill. katholische Kroaten, 1.8 orthodoxe Serben, 700.000 bis 800.000 Moslems zum groessten Teil kroatische Blues, aber doch eigenes Volkstum.

an einer solchen Loesung nicht abgeneigt. Leider hatte die stets gleich ungeschickte deutsche Aussenpolitik den Staat von Anbeginn der unkonstruktiven, terroristischen Ustaschabewegung, einer absoluten Minderheit, ausgeliefert.

Fuenf Monate hindurch glueckte der deutschen Wehrmacht die Abstinenz vom Buergerkrieg, der sich im wesentlichen zwischen der Ustascha und ihren Terrorbanden einerseits und den nationalistischen orthodoxen Tschetnitzi andererseits abspielte. Da wurden anfangs Sept. 1941 bei Sarajevo zwei deutsche Sanitaetsautos von Aufstaendischen ueberfallen. Nun kam die Lawine ins Rollen. Es waehrte nur mehr kurz, da sah sich die deutsche Wehrmacht in den Buergerkrieg hineingezogen, und zwar auf jener Seite, die ihren Fuehrern auch in der Folge nie Sympathien einfloesste, auf Seiten "Ustascha-Kroatiens". Die Abneigung gegen dieses blieb den deutschen Fuehrern bis zum Schluss, nicht ohne Grund stellten es die Ustascha-Terroristen, stellte es der ustaschahoerige deutsche Gesandte immer wieder fest.

Der in unerwuenschter Bundesgenossenschaft gefuehrte Kampf der allmaehlich verstaerkten deutschen Bataillone mit den nationalistischen Aufstaendischen Orthodoxen gipfelte in einer Reihe von "Befriedungsaktionen", die unter dem Oberbefehl von Ob.Suedost und unter diesem eines in Belgrad stehenden Reserve-Generalkommandos durchgefuehrt wurden: Ende 1941 in Nordostbosnien, April 1942 nordoestlich von Sarajevo, Sommer 1942 noerdlich von Banja Luka und in kleinerem Ausmass in Syrmien. Waehrend dieser Kaempfe foerderten die Italiener in ihrem Besetzungsgebiet die Tschetnik-Bewegung unausgesetzt wider die katholischen Kroaten. Dennoch kam es noerdlich der deutsch-italienischen Demarkationslinie allmaehlich zu einer Art von Waffenstillstand, an dem auch die kroatischen Truppen und selbst die Ustascha-Miliz partizipierten.

Irgendwelche Ausrottungsbefehle kamen in diesen Kaempfen meines Wissens - im Gegensatz etwa zur bluetigen "Saeuberung" der Matschwa westlich von Belgrad - nicht zur Auswirkung. Zu erinnern ist allerdings / fuer spaetere Kampfphasen noch weit mehr / an die traditionelle Grausamkeit jeglicher Balkankriegfuehrung. Waehrend der Okkupation Bosniens durch die oesterr.Truppen im Jahr 1878 erschossen sich

fussmarode Soldaten, die zurueckbleiben mussten, um den ueblichen Massakrierungen durch serbische und tuerki-Insurgenten zu entgehen. Diese Masskrierungen kamen auch jetzt wieder vor, auch an deutschen Soldaten und Repressiv-Massnahmen blieben selbstverstaendlich nicht aus. Aber Gefangennahme und Entwaffnung der Aufstaendischen war doch die Regel. Bezeichnenderweise zogen es schliesslich viele orthodoxe Bewohner Kroatiens aus Furcht vor den Ausrottungsplaenen der Ustascha selbst vor, sich als Arbeiter fuer Deutschland heuern zu lassen.

In dem Sommer 1942 fiel das Aufflammen der Tito-Bewegung, das sich urspruenglich auch auf italienischem Besatzungsboden und unter italienischer Patronanz vollzog. Im Fruhsommer 1942 wuchs aus der Dreilaenderecke Herzegowina-Montenegro-Sandschak jenes seltsame "Partisanenreich" heraus, das sich, zunaechst ausschliesslich suedlich der Demarkationslinie, also im italienischen Bereich, allgemach bis in den Raum suedlich von Agram erstreckte und bei einer Laenge von 400 km 100 bis 150 km breit war. Die Leitung dieser Bewegung war entsprechend der Persoenlichkeit ihres Hochbegabten Fuehrers Tito ausgesprochen kommunistisch. In der nationalen Zusammensetzung der Bewegung ueberwog anfaenglich das serbische Element entscheidend. Dieser Charakter aenderte sich jedoch bald. So stiessen gleich zu Anbeginn des Vormarsches gegen Nordwesten zahlreiche kroatische Insurgenten aus dem italienischen Besatzungsgebiet, ganze "Brigaden" zu Tito. Aber auch noerdlich der Demarkationslinie wuchsen ihm bald zahlreiche Bundesgenossen zu, nicht zuletzt aus dem Lager jener Kroaten, die nicht laenger den Terror der Ustaschaminoritaet erleiden mochten; unter ihnen befand sich der Politiker Rybar, der Bildhauer Augustintschital der Dichter Nazor. Gleichzeitig girff die Partisanenbewegung auf das deutsche Besatzungsgebiet ueber. Zumal noerdlich der Save bildeten sich mehrere Partisanenbrigaden, die namentlich die immer zahlreicher werdenden Anschlaege gegen die Bahn Agram - Belgrad mit ihren vielen Opfern an deutschem Soldatenleben veranstalteten. Diese Anschlaege, die in aehnlicher Weise auch gegenueber den Bahnen suedlich der Save ausgefuehrt wurden, zeitigten deutscher- und kroatischerseits "Suehnemass-

nahmen", die zweifellos den anfechtbarsten Teil der Kriegfuehrung gegen die Partisanen darstellten.

Was ueber die Grausamkeit der Balkankaempfe schon andeutungsweise gesagt worden ist, galt auch fuer die nun folgende neue Kriegsphase. Von den Partisanen wurden Ustascha-Soldaten grundsatzlich ohne Ausnahme erschossen, wenn sie in Gefangenschaft gerieten. "Domobranen", d.h. Soldaten der kroatischen Wehrmacht, wurden in der Regel entwaффnet und nachhause geschickt oder sie fanden nach ihrer Gefangennahme freiwillig oder unfreiwillig den Weg in die Reihen der Partisanen. Gegenueber deutschen Soldaten kamen gewiss Faelle von Toetung und Massakrierung Gefangener vor. Vielfach wurden sie jedoch schlecht und recht als Gefangene am Leben erhalten, um nach Moeglichkeit Austauschobjekt zu bilden. Da die Austauschaktion auch die Kroaten mitinbegriff, fiel ihre Lenkung mir als Bevollmaechtigten deutschen General zu. Tito forderte als Tauschobjekt fuer deutsche und kroatische Soldaten meist prominente Anhaenger seiner Bewegung. Mitunter auch solche, die sich weigerten, zu ihm zu gehen. Auf dem Wege ueber den Gefangenenaustausch wurden auch Versuche zur Milderung besonderer Haerten der Kriegfuehrung unternommen, allerdings auf beiden Seiten mit geringem Erfolg.

Generelle Erschiessungsbefehle wurden, so viel ich weiss, im kroatischen Partisanenkrieg auf deutscher Seite nicht ertlassen, oertliche Weisungen dieser Art kamen, beeinflusst durch das Tempo der Kriegfuehrung, wohl vor. Ich verfehlte in meinen Berichten nie, auf das Uebel beredt hinzuweisen, wobei allerdings Argumente der Zweckmaessigkeit ins Treffen gefuehrt werden mussten, da ethische Bedenken an der obersten Spitze den gegenteiligen Effekt erzielt haetten. Fuer die zu Beginn 1943 einsetzende allgemeine deutsch-kroatische Offensive gegen das "Tito-Reich" zwischen Agram und Mostar, bei der Tito voruebergehend bis weit nach Suedosten zurueckgedraengt wurde, kam von oben der muendliche Auftrag, in dem von unseren Truppen zu durchschreitenden Gebiet auch Greise, Frauen und Kinder nicht zu schonen. Es glueckte mir, durch eine entschiedene Verwahrung und auch auf Um-

wegen die Ausfuehrung dieses Befehls zu vereiteln. Ebenso nahm auf mein Betreiben im August 1944 die Heeresleitung die Weisung zurueck, beim bevorstehenden Rueckzug von der Kueste die dortigen Staedte weitgehend zu zerst hoeren und ihre gesamte Einwohnerschaft in einem Todesmarsch hinter die Save zurueckzufuehren.

Ueber die Zerst oerung der vier Doerfer an der Cetina und die Ermordung ihrer Bewohner Ende Maerz 1944 gab ich muendliche Aufklaerungen, soweit ich sie nach meiner Kenntnis der Dinge geben konnte. Es ist nicht anzunehmen, dass ein hoeheres Kommando dazu den Befehl gegeben hat, auch das Divisionskommando nicht. Die "Aktion" scheint aus niedrigeren Verbaenden herausgewachsen zu sein, entfacht vielleicht durch den Nationalhass serbisch-banater SS-Soldaten gegen die katholischen Bewohner der kroatischen Doerfer. Ebenso ist es aber leider Tatsache geblieben, dass es der SS Dank ihrem Sonderdienstweg gelang, der Untersuchung durch das 2. PanzerAK (Rendulic) auszuschluepfen und die Angelegenheit schliesslich im Sande verlaufen zu lassen. Der Einzige, der, ausser den armen Kroaten an der Cetina, am Platze blieb, war der kroatische Aussenminister, der auf Geheiss Ribbentrops zuruecktreten musste, weil sein Gesandter in der Wilhelmstrasse allzu stuermisch Genugtuung erheischte.

Dass die Vernichtung von Ortschaften auch sonst im kroatischen Partisanenkrieg - und zwar auf beiden Seiten eine hoechst traurige Rolle gespielt hat, ist bekannt. Die beiden Parteien des Bruderkrieges hatten in den Ortschaften ihre offenen und geheimen Bundesgenossen, die an dem so listenreich gefuehrten Kriege mitwirkten. Repressalien, oft unberechtigt und noch oefter uebers Ziel schiessend, waren auf beiden Seiten die Folge. Die maennliche Bevoelkerung wurde von den Deutschen mitunter zur Zwangsarbeit abgefuehrt (die zuletzt auch fuer Gefangene Partisanen vorgesehen war), von den Partisanen eventuell zwangsweise in die eigenen Reihen gepresst.

Fluenderungen, Raub und aehnliche Ausschreitungen gehoerten bei den deutschen Truppen bis zu Beginn von 1943 zu den seltenen Ausnahmen. Sie wurden in dieser Zeit strengstens geahndet. Nach Neujahr 1943 begann das Auftreten von SS-Truppen

die guten Sitten zu verderben und die Kosaken, die im Spätsommer 1943 eingesetzt wurden, setzten mit ihren unzähligen Schandtaten die Krone auf. Anträge nach oben, diese Truppe ehestens wieder aus dem slavischen Lande wegzuziehen, wurden schliesslich mit der Weisung abgetan, von solchen Vorschlägen in Zukunft abzusehen, da man die Kosaken aus Mangel anderer Truppen belassen müsse.

Das schlechte Beispiel wirkte allmählich teilweise auch auf die Heeres-truppen zurück. Wie sich in den ersten zwei Jahren bei Freund und Feind wirklichen Ansehens erfreuten. Naturgemäss spielte auch die Länge der Kriegsdauer eine Rolle.

Ein Gegenstand und besonderer Sehnsucht Hitlers war es, Titos entweder lebendig oder tot habhaft zu werden. Einmal schien der Vielgesuchte schon im Mai 1943 östlich von Sarajevo zusammen mit einigen Tausenden von Mitkämpfern völlig unzugänglich zu sein. Er entkam jedoch in gewohnter Weise. Ganz besondere Hoffnungen setzte man im Frühjahr 1941 in das Fallschirmunternehmen "Rösselsprung", durch das Tito bei Drvar (südlich von Banja Luka) ausgehoben werden sollte. Der Abflug der Fallschirmer erfolgte bei Agram, wurde aber so geheim gehalten, dass ich das Unternehmen erst nach seinem Missglücken erfuhr. Dabei scheinen, wie ich kürzlich in Nürnberg hörte, ziemlich scharfe "Liquidierungsbefehle" ergangen zu sein, die auch vor alliierten Militäremissionen nicht Halt machten. Tito entkam abermals. Nur seine in Anfertigung begriffene Marschallsuniform wurde ins Wiener Heeresmuseum gebracht.

Der Ausrottungskrieg der Ustascha gegen die orthodoxen Staatsgenossen hatte inzwischen im Frühjahr 1942 einen gewissen Höhepunkt erreicht. Bei aller Unzufriedenheit mit den sonstigen Ergebnissen meiner ziemlich eigenwillig betriebenen Sonderpolitik in Kroatien-Jugoslawien rechne ich es mir zu einer gewissen Befriedigung, dass mein respektwidriges Eingreifen als bevollmächtigter General (die Sache gehörte ausschliesslich in die Zuständigkeit des Gesandten) einiges zu diesem Abflauen des grossen planmässigen Vernichtungskampfes der Agramer Clique gegen die Serben beitragen konnte. Einzelaktionen dieser Art hörten wohl auch in der Folge nicht auf und auch die durch mich bis zu meinem Sturz vom amtlichen

Sektor ferngehaltenen boesartigsten Ustascha-Terroristen betaetigten sich hinter den Kulissen, gefoerdert durch Pavelic, weiter und trieben damit auch Tito unablaessig Verstaerkungen zu. Weitgehend fand die Auseinandersetzung nationaler Art immer mehr im Rahmen des Partisanenkrieges statt, wobei allerdings Serben, Katholiken und Moslims in beiden Lagern oder, die Tschetnitsi, mit inbegriffen in allen dreien fochten. Erst im Jahre 1945 nach Abzug der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien hat sich Tito gegenueber offenbar eine nationalistische Front zusammengeschlossen, die von Draza Mihajolovic bis zu den nicht allzu kompromittierten Ustascha alle nationalisitschen Elemente zu umfassen scheint.

-----OCCO-----

gez. Glaise-Horstenau.

BR 3869

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9 APR 46

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER
APO 757

CI INTERMEDIATE INTERROGATION REPORT (CI-IIR) No 51

PRISONER: Obst/Lt SENSBURG, Walter Albert Lothar, CO of
Leit Stelle I Süd Ost für Front Aufklärung

SENSBURG served with the Abwehr in FASSEL and WIESBADEN before the war, and then served as Gruppen Leiter I with Ast BRUSSELS in 1940. He transferred to ATHENS in the same capacity in 1941, and later became Leiter of the Ast in that city. In August 1943 he became CO of L/Stelle I SC.

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By <u>WNO 76004</u>
DATE <u>11/13/78</u>

1. REFERENCES

USFET MIS Center CI-IIR No 50, published mid-February 1946

2. REASON FOR REPORT

Brief from UK Base, CI War Room, UK 59587, dtd 7 Nov 45, S 30371

3. INTERROGATION RESULTS

a. Subject's Life History

Walter SENSEBURG was born 6 Sep 96 in MUENCHEN. He attended schools there, entered the Cadet Corps in 1904, and was graduated from Gymnasium in 1914. An officer candidate at the outbreak of the war, he received his commission in 1915. He left the Army in 1919 and bought an interest in a firm which produced educational and travel films. The concern eventually went bankrupt and SENSEBURG lost all his savings.

In 1934 SENSEBURG joined the Wehrmacht and became Abwehr Gruppenleiter I with the staff of IX Army Corps, KASSEL. In 1936 Gruppe I was transferred from KASSEL to WILSHADEN to join the newly-formed General Kdo XII. Gruppe I concerned itself there with the procurement of military information on S Belgium and France. In 1940 SENSEBURG assumed the additional duties of NOB (Nachrichten Beschaffungs Offizier) with 1 German Army at BAD KREUZNACH. In this capacity he furnished the Ic with information submitted by Frontlaeufer and V-Loete.

SENSEBURG was transferred to Belgium on 20 May 40 as Leiter I of the newly-created Ast BRUSSELS. In May 1941 he was sent to Greece to serve first as Leiter I and then (July 1942) as chief of Ast ATHENS. In August 1943 he flew to BELGRADE to take charge of Leit Stelle I Sued Ost fuer Front Aufklaerung, and he remained in this position until May 1945, when he was placed in the PWE at RADSTADT, Austria. He was discharged in June but was taken into custody again at WILSHADEN, 25 Aug 45.

b. Front Aufklaerung in the Balkans

(1) History

During the combat phase of operations in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece in April and May 1941, intelligence was furnished by Abwehr I men attached to the advancing troops as Nachrichten Beschaffungs Offiziers. Their work was supplemented by mobile Abwehr III units like Einsatz Kdo SCHMALISCHLAGER.

After formal hostilities ceased at the end of May 1941, the Abwehr set itself up on a territorial basis, and Asts ATHENS, BELGRADE, SALONIKI, and ZAGREB were organized.

Because of the growing danger of an Allied invasion from Italy and because of the increased scale of Partisan activities, the territorial Abwehr setup was abandoned in Summer 1943 and mobile Front Aufklaerung units were activated.

(2) Activating the Front Aufklaerung Units

The dissolving Asts aided in the activation of the Front Aufklaerung units by supplying them with specialized personnel and equipment. The resources of Gruppen I, II, or III of the Asts were placed at the disposal of the respective I, II, or III FA unit. Ast ATHENS had, for instance, to supply personnel and equipment for the following organizations:

- (a) L/Stelle I SO, O/Bef SO - Gruppe I personnel
- (b) FAT 127 - Gruppe I personnel
- (c) FAT 170 - Gruppe I personnel
- (d) NBO beim Asm Aegeis - Gruppe L-I-III/50 personnel
- (e) FAT 375 - Gruppe III personnel
- (f) FAT 376 - Gruppe III personnel
- (g) FAT 219 - Gruppe II personnel
- (h) AO des Bef Sued Griechenland - Gruppe III personnel

The new FAs were usually able to start operating at once in the territory of the former Ast.

(3) Organization

(a) O/Bef Sued Ost In August 1943 the O/Kds of Army Group F moved from SALONIKI to BELGRADE and Gen Rm von WEICHS assumed command of the Balkan theater. His organization was known as O/Bef Sued Ost.

(b) The Io of O/Bef SO was Obst von HARLING (succeeded by Obst/Lt WARNSTORF in March 1945). The services of all the FA units in the area were at his disposal, and orders from OKW, Abwehr in BERLIN to the FA units in the Balkans were channelled through his office. L/Stellen I and II SO and FAK 201 were directly under the Io and transmitted his orders to the subordinate FAKs and FAs I, II, and III. Liaison between the FA organization and the Io was managed by Obst/Lt HINTERSELER (replaced by Obst/Lt HAMMER in March 1945). This coordinator was the only man in the office of the O/Bef SO who had a complete picture of Front Aufklaerung operations in the theater. The chief of L/Stelle I SO, for instance, knew only of matters pertaining to Front Aufklaerung I operations, and had nothing to do with Abwehr II or III.

(c) FAKs 176, 124, 310, & 390 were under the jurisdiction of the Io of 2 Panzer Army and the Io of Army Group E, and relayed instructions to the I and III FAs in the zones of 2 Pz Armees and HG E. Their activities were coordinated by the L/Stellen I or III SO.

(4) Functions of the I, II, & III FAs

(a) I FAs conducted reconnaissance missions against the Partisans and the Red Army and filtered agents into enemy territory to radio back military information.

(b) II FAs often carried out special combat missions, such as the clearing and securing of important highways. Balkan collaborationists and Cossack fighters were often attached to these FAs. The I and III FAs never enlisted aliens of this sort as regular members of their units.

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(c) III WTs were supplied with false and worthless information by Obst/Lt HINTERSEER which they were to use as "Spielmaterial" to deceive the enemy. SLANSBURG has no detailed information regarding the employment of these ruses. The CO of L/Stelle III SO maintained close contact with the Croatian authorities, with the Geheime Feld Polizei, and with the SD, concerning police questions involving the Front Aufklarung service.

(5) Front Aufklarung Finances

All regular military expenses incurred by the F.A. units were handled through ordinary channels. All expenses peculiar to F.A. work were regulated by the paymaster in the office of the Ic of O/Bef SO, O/Zahlmeister POSCHMANN (succeeded by S/Intendant ROESCH in autumn 1944). All decisions on F.A. disbursements lay with the Ic.

Agents signed receipts with their cover names. The paymaster was responsible only for the correctness of the account, and not for the advisability or purpose of the expense. He submitted the accounts monthly to the Chef Abw (ZF) and requisitioned the necessary monies in foreign currency, gold, and so forth.

(6) Channels of Communication

The Abwehr Funk Loiter in the office of the Ic, O/Bef SO, Hptm WEBER, coordinated the entire radio service of the Front Aufklarung units and individual agents in the Balkans. His duties also included the training of W/T agents and the procurement of equipment from the Funk Loiter SO, WIEN.

Carrier pigeon service was handled by Brieftaubenzug Balkan under the command of O/Lt MOELLER.

Personnel of Aufloi Sued Ost:

Commanding Officer: Hptm WEBER (September 1943-November 1944) Hptm FLADE (November 1944-May 1945)

Deputy : O/Lt M.TZ

Other officers : Lt HUNDT

NCO'S : Wachtm. SCHLACHER

" BECKER

" KRAEHL

" FRITZKEMPER

" PAUL

Uffz FUCHS

" GRASSE

" LANGEMEIER

" REITER

" RICHTER

" WULFHOPF

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(7) Training of W/T Agents

An officer of a FAK or FAK would first instruct the prospective W/T agent in reconnaissance work and other tactical aspects of Front Aufklärung. When it was seen that the man had intelligence possibilities--and not until then--radio-technical training was begun by instructors from the office of the Abw Funk Leiter (Afulci). Reconnaissance equipment (maps, compass, etc) were provided by the F. unit. Radio equipment was provided by the Abw Funk Leiter.

Until Summer 1944 the Afulci's radio station maintained communication only with the W/T agents of Front Aufklärung Sued Ost, but subsequently the Afulci took over radio contact with all W/T agents in the Balkans. His station was located near WILN until March 1945, probably at BREITENFURT. It was later transferred to OBING (Bavaria), near the Chiemsee.

(8) Technical and Specialized Equipment

Technical requirements of the Front Aufklärung service were filled by the G-Staffel in the office of the Io, O/bef SO. CO of the unit was Hptm Dr S. SSEL (replaced by O/Lt K. YSER in Summer 1944). Secret inks, forged documents, and photographic equipment were the items commonly handled.

(9) Front Aufklärung I Organization

Loit Stelle I Sued Ost beim O/bef SO was the highest F. I agency in the Balkans and gave orders pertaining to Abwehr matters to all FAKs and F.Ts under its jurisdiction.

FAK 176 (and later FAK 124) stood between I/Stelle I SO and the F.Ts and passed on and elaborated orders from Obst/Lt SENSEBURG to F.Ts 125-129, 167-174, 177, and 178, and, for a short time, 117 and 118.

The Io at O/bef SO received instructions of a general Abwehr nature from the Chief of the Abwehr service in BERLIN. I/Stelle I SO also received general instructions, pertaining only, however, to F. I problems.

F. I work on the Russian and Bulgarian fronts was conducted by F.Ts 167, 168, 169, 170, 177, 178, 117, and 118. Results were meager and unsatisfactory since the F. personnel working on the NE and E borders of Yugoslavia was unacquainted with the terrain and the temper of the people. The F.Ts had no experienced agents and few interpreters.

Some of the F.Ts were occupied with the problem of establishing W/T agents in Allied-occupied Italy. It was feared that an invasion of the Balkans would be launched from that quarter. WILNER of F.T 173 (see Annex I) was, however, the only W/T agent eventually to submit information of any value.

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F.T 127 in Greece and Crete, (of USFET MIS Center CI-IIR 50, published mid-February 1946) F.T 128 in Serbia and Albania, and F.T 129 in Croatia were occupied with the setting up of nets of stay-behind agents (R-Netze). Their labors met with little success. After the Allied occupation of Greece and Serbia not more than three messages of any value were ever sent from ATHENS and BELGRADE. No messages of any sort emanated from Croatia.

(10) L/Stelle I SO fuer Front Aufklaerung

(a) History: L/Stelle I SO began operations in BELGRADE on 25 Aug 43 under the command of Obst/Lt SENSEBURG. Most of the cadre and equipment of the L/Stelle had been taken over from 1st ATHENS (dissolved August 1943). From 25 Aug 43 to 22 Apr 45 the L/Stelle was stationed at the Hq of O/Bef SO.

(b) Headquarters:
BELGRADE, 25 Aug 43-beginning of October 1944

VUKOVAR, until end of October 1944

ZAGREB, until 22 Apr 45

HOEFLEIN (nr LJUBLJANA) until 6 May 45, then withdrawal via KLAGENFURT and RADSTADT, Austria, into vicinity of WEILHEIM (Bavaria)

(c) Mission of L/Stelle I SO: This office furnished the Io, O/Bef SO, with practical proposals concerning the employment of the F.I units. This prevented to some extent the possibility of the Io, O/Bef SO, and his subordinate Io's, sending the F.Is on foolish and incompatible errands. The L/Stelle also issued specific Abwehr instructions to all F.Is and F.Is in the South East to supplement the general military operational orders issued by the Io, O/Bef SO.

The following factors complicated Front Aufklaerung operations in the Balkans:

1 The tribal feuds and antipathies which set Regions, tribes, religious sects, and political parties at violent odds limited the usefulness of individual agents who themselves bore these grudges.

2 The rugged character of the terrain and the lack of good roads made movement precarious and slow.


3 The Yugoslav hatred for Germany and the increasing hope of liberation by the Allies made the procurement of reliable Balkan agents more difficult as time went on.

4 The growing strength of Partisan forces rendered operations perilous.

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FA I SO Organization of Command (October 1943)



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(d) Gruppe Sichtung of L/Stelle I SO had to check all incoming information with the aid of handbooks, maps, previous reports, and other reference material. It edited and consolidated reports from F.I. units in the field, and disseminated them to interested agencies. Under no circumstances was L/Stelle I SO allowed to evaluate a report. This function was assumed exclusively by the Ic's. L/Stelle I SO was seldom told what action the Ic proposed to take on the basis of any particular report.

(e) Agents of L/Stelle I SO: It was not necessary for the L/Stelle to maintain agents of its own, but an exception was made in the case of W/T agents working behind the Allied lines in Italy. The recruiting of such operatives was the job of F.K. 176 and F.Ts 170, 171, 172, 173, and 174. About 12 Italian soldiers were enlisted and placed in a special training unit set up by O/Lt KLESSLING of Gruppe B, L/Stelle I SO, in a house in the DEDINJE suburb of BERGAMO. Chief instructor of this unit was one HAYNALL (alias HEINRICH), a former 1st Lt in the Italian Military Intelligence Service. W/T instruction was provided by one FUCHS (probably a cover name) from the office of the Aufkl SO.

The special training unit later transferred to BREITENFURT, nr MILAN, where rations and quarters were provided by 1st MILAN. One group of agents was sent into Italy in 1944 and another early in 1945. Both batches were dropped by parachute from planes of Geschwader 200. KLESSLING and HAYNALL accompanied the second group. L/Stelle I SO never received word from any one in either of the groups. Lt W.SCHGLER or Sdf WERTENS, both of the L/Stelle, may be able to shed more light on the subject.

(f) Personnel of L/Stelle I SO:

Commanding Officer:
Obst/Lt Walter SENSEBURG

Deputies:
O/Lt ROLSSLER (Autumn 1943)
Maj PROBST (Winter 1943-Spring 1944)
Hptm SCHETLER (Summer and Autumn 1944)
Maj BRUNNICH (Winter 1944-capitulation)

Other Officers:
Maj WODICZAL
Hptm FOLTZNER
Hptm GOTSCHALK
Hptm BADOW (only for a short time)
Hptm SCHITTNER
Hptm OHRICH
Hptm von KUMPHOLVENER
O/Lt KOENIG
O/Lt KLESSLING
O/Lt MOLTZE (later with F.T 169)

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O/Lt REICHERT
Lt von CODELLI (only for a short time)
Lt REITZ (later with F.T 167)
Lt WOKSCHNER
Lt W. SCHGLER
Lt REICHERT
Sgt MERTENS
Sgt METZNER
Sgt SUTTE
Sgt K. RGER
Sgt GROLL

NCOs:
Fw ALBERT (later with F.T 125)
Fw BERGMANN
Fw GEUE
Fw KUGLMEYER
Fw L. NZINGLER
Fw STUNA
Gefr HELFER
Gefr SPERBER
Gefr WEISSEL

(g) Dissemination of Information: F.Ts received information from their message centers (Meldeköpfe) and individual agents, consolidated and edited the data, and forwarded reports (with remarks evaluation the source) to: F.T. 176 in the case of F.Ts 172, 173, 174, 126 W and 126 O; to the Ic of "Heeres Gruppe E" in the case of F.Ts 170, 171, and 124; to the "Deutscher General Griechenland" in the case of F.T 127; to the "Deutscher General in Kroatien" in the case of F.T 129; and to the "Deutscher General in Serbien" in the case of F.Ts 125 and 128. In addition, the F.Ts sent copies of all reports to L/Stelle I SO.

F.T. 176 forwarded all reports from its subordinate F.Ts to the Ic of 2 Pz Army. It forwarded to L/Stelle I SO only those reports which were collected by its own agents.

L/Stelle I SO had to submit all incoming information to the Ic, O/Bef SO; all information except that of a purely local nature to Fronte Heere West; all important information of Abwehr interest to Abwehr I, BERLIN (later Chef F.); all information pertinent to the territory covered by 2 Pz Army, Heeres Gruppe E, Deutscher General in Kroatien, Befehlshaber Serbien to the Ic's of those commands, provided the data had not already been submitted by the F.Ts. L/Stelle I SO disseminated all information of naval interest to Marine Gruppen Kdo Sued, and all material of local naval interest to Admiral Adria and Admiral Aegeis. All information of air force interest was given to Luftwaffen Kdo SO, and air force information of local interest to Flieger Korps I, Luftgau Belgrad, Flieger Fuehrer Albanien, and Flieger Fuehrer Kroatien. Heeres Gruppe Sued received information pertinent to its zone of operations, as did O/Bef Sued (Italy).

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The German military attache at SCFA (later Deutscher General in Bulgarien) received all information L/Stelle I SO gathered on partisan activity in Bulgaria. L/Stelle III SO received information pertinent to FA III operations, and WAF 201 all information concerning FA II.

4. CONCLUSIONS

None

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None

JM;HCB;eh

For the Commanding Officer:

George Tenzel
GEORGE TENZEL
1st Lt., AUS
Chief, CI Section

9 Mar 46

DISTRIBUTION "D" plus CI War Room and AC of S, G-2
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ANNEX I

FRONT ANFÜHRUNG I UNITS IN THE BALKANS

PRISONER: Obst/Lt SENSBURG, Walter Albert Lothar, CO of
Leit Stelle I Süd Ost

1. FAK 176

Personnel: Obst/Lt Dr HEMPRICH (Commanding Officer)
Hptm WILKS (Deputy CO)
Lt MONTAG
FW KUNZMANN

History: When 1st ZAGREB was dissolved FAK 176 was activated in September 1943 under the command of Obst/Lt HEMPRICH, former Leiter of the 1st. FAK 176 was assigned to 2 Pz Army from September 1943 until Spring 1945 and operated mainly in Croatia. In November 1944 2 Pz Army and FAK 176 were withdrawn from O/Bof SO and transferred to S Hungary and later to the Western Front. After November 1944 L/Stelle I SO had nothing further to do with FAK 176.

Headquarters: FAK 176 Hq was located, Autumn 1943-September 1944 in VRANJEK, BANJA, Jugoslavia, SW of BELGRADE; September 1944-early November 1944 in NUSTAR, Jugoslavia, SW of VUKOVAR; and then in S Hungary.

Mission: The duties of FAK 176 involved the transmission of Abwehr instructions to all I FAKs operating under the jurisdiction of 2 Pz Army, and maintaining liaison with L/Stelle I SO. FAK 176 had little success with its agents, most of whom had been recruited by the old 1st ZAGREB. Information received had generally only a local value, but seemed to fill the demands of the IC of 2 Pz Army who was principally interested in information of a tactical nature. FAK 176 maintained no special agents' training camps.

FAKs under jurisdiction of FAK 176:

FAT 126 Ost (Autumn 1943-Autumn 1944)
FAT 126 West (Autumn 1943-Autumn 1944)
FAT 172 (Autumn 1943-September 1944)
FAT 173 (Autumn 1943-September 1944)
FAT 174 (" " " ")
FAT 125 (mid-October 1944-November 1944)

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F.T 168 (Summer 1944-November 1944)
F.T 169 (Spring 1944-September 1944)
F.T 117, 118, and 167 (Summer 1944-May 1945; accompanied F.K 176 to S Hungary)

2. F.K 124

Commanding Officers: O/Lt MUETZE (Spring 1944)
Lt REUTZ (early Summer 1944)
O/Lt FROELICH (Summer 1944-January 1945)
Maj SCHALLER (February 1945)
Hptm AMANN (March-May 1945)

History: F.K 124 was activated late 1943 or early 1944 at SALONIKI, Greece. It carried the normal T/O of a F.K (36 men), but had no Trupps under its jurisdiction until January 1945, when it took over F.Ts 125, 126 Ost, 126 West, 170, 172, 173, 174, 177, and 178.

L/Stelle I SO lost contact with F.K 124 after 22 Apr 45. It was always assigned to the Io of Heeres Gruppe E.

Headquarters: F.K 124 was stationed first at SALONIKI, and then moved to LARISSA, Greece, maintaining Meldekoepfe at LAMIA, VOLOS, and POLYGIROS. Its last Hq was at ZAGREB.

Mission: In February 1945 F.K 124 assumed the task of giving Abwehr instructions to the I F.Ts in Slovenia and N Croatia, and maintaining liaison between them and L/Stelle I SO. F.K 124 maintained no camp for the training of agents and had little success with the few V-Leute it controlled. O/Lt MUETZE was an inefficient commander, and while O/Lt FROELICH achieved better results, the information he uncovered was only of local tactical value.

3. F.T 125

Personnel: Hptm BUEHLER (CO, Autumn 1943-June 1944)
Lt VOGT (CO, June 1944-August 1944)
Lt TUMCHINA (CO, August 1944-February 1945)
Lt BUEHLER (CO, March-May 1945)
Lt WERNHOLD (Spring 1944)
O/Lt MUETZE (for short period in 1944)
Sdf GROMME (missing)
Fw ALBERT (killed)

History: F.T 125 was activated in BELGRADE in the Fall of 1943. Personnel and equipment were inherited from Gruppe I of the inactivated 1st BELGRADE. The Trupp had the actual strength of a F.K (36 men) since it took over the F.K operations conducted against Partisans in the entire state of Serbia. When F.T 125 was taken out of Serbia, its strength was reduced to that of a regular F.T (14 men). After working against Partisans in Serbia, it took up operations against guerrillas in E Croatia and S Styria.

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Headquarters were set up in BELGRADE and then in POZAREVAC, NISH, NEGOTIN, and SJBENICA, Serbia, and then near RUM. NUSTAR, and VINKOVICI, Croatia. Source SENGEBURG does not know where F.T. 125 was stationed after September 1944. The Troop was assigned to the Ic of Bef Sorbion, Autumn 1943-mid-October 1944; then to the Ic of 2 Pz Army; and then, December 1944-May 1945, to the Ic of Army Group E.

Mission: F.T. 125 conducted reconnaissance operations against the Partisans in Serbia and, after October 1944, in Slovenia. In April 1945 it functioned ineffectually in Styria, nr DR. VOGRAD. F.T. 125 took over the Meldekoepfe and quite a number of agents of Gruppe I, 1st BELGRADE, allowing for a minimum of disruption when the 1st was dissolved.

4. F.T. 126 West

Personnel: Hptm Dr OTTO (Commanding Officer)
O/Lt PESCHKE

History: This F.T. was activated in Autumn 1943, personnel and equipment being taken over from Gruppe I, 1st Z.GREB.

Headquarters were located at Z.GREB until May 1945, and Meldekoepfe were maintained at SIZAK, KARLOVAC, and later in VUKOSADIN, Croatia. F.T. 126 West was assigned to the Ic of 2 Pz Army, Autumn 1943-Autumn 1944. After October 1944 the F.T. was assigned to the Ic of the "Deutsche General in Kroatien."

Mission: F.T. 126 West conducted reconnaissance operations against the Partisans in NW Croatia and on the Adriatic coast. Hptm OTTO and O/Lt PESCHKE (who had lived in KARLOVAC before the war) were well-acquainted with the population and the terrain and were able to hire reliable agents. They produced a number of good reports of local interest for the fighting troops.

5. F.T. 126 Ost

Personnel: Hptm MANN (CO - succeeded by Sef MERTENS)
Lt MOESMER
Sef SCHWARZ (?)
Gefr POISL

History: F.T. 126 Ost was activated in Autumn 1943, mainly from personnel and equipment of the deactivated 1st Z.GREB, for the purpose of conducting Front Aufklaerung operations against the Partisans in SE Croatia. F.T. work in Styria under Sef MERTENS in April 1945 had to be given up owing to the haste of the German retreat. Some members of the F.T. were in the P.E. at GRAIN, Austria, and received discharges at WEILHEIM (Upper Bavaria).

F.T. 126 Ost was assigned to the Ic of 2 Pz Army, Autumn 1943-Autumn 1944. After October 1944 it served the Ic of Army Group E.

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Hptm MANN knew his territory and had reliable agents who delivered quite useful tactical information on the Partisans. Higher intelligence authorities were so pleased with MANN'S work that he was given command of F.K 124 at the beginning of February 1945.

Headquarters were located, Autumn 1943-early 1945, at S.RAJEVO. Melokopci were established in BRD, DUBOV, and B.NJ. LUKA, Croatia. At the end of 1943 the Melokopf at B.NJ. LUKA was attacked by Partisans, its CO was taken prisoner or killed, and important classified documents fell into the hands of the enemy.

6. F.T 128

Personnel: O/Lt TOPLAK (Commanding Officer)
Lt HOFMANN (since Autumn 1944)
Sdr POISL (later with F.T 129)
Sdr FICHLER
Gefr MESSITSCHKE

History: F.T 128 was activated in Autumn 1943 at BELGRADE, personnel and equipment being taken over from 1st BELGRADE. O/Lt TOPLAK spoke fluent Serbo-Croat and had a fair knowledge of the country. He may now be in Camp 74, LUDWIGSBURG.

The F.T stayed in Serbia until October 1944, when half the F.T proceeded to TRIESTE and the other half operated in S Styria. F.T 128 was assigned to Army Gp E and was, until October 1944, attached to Bof Serbian.

Headquarters were maintained at BELGRADE until October 1944, then at BUKOVKA (Slovenia), and then at RUDOLFSBURG, Austria, and TRIESTE Italy.

Mission of F.T 128 was to organize an R-Netz in Serbia and Albania. It acquired some agents in Serbia, but none were to be had in the province of Istria or around RUDOLFSBURG. After the German withdrawal from Serbia only one agent continued to send messages: REYKO (cover name), who was stationed in BELGRADE. He transmitted three messages of military value on the movements of Red Army troops he had witnessed. Another agent (alias probably NUCUL) was dropped by parachute behind the lines in Albania, but nothing was ever heard from him.

Before he joined F.T 128 and during his early days with the unit, O/Lt TOPLAK took charge of a special mission for the late Jbst HENSEN. Source SENSEBURG believes that this mission merely involved the forwarding of messages or orders to an agent of Abw I, BERLIN, in BELGRADE (alias P.JUL.), and the booking of places on planes and the procurement of visas and permits for associates of P.JUL.

Maj MUNZINGER of Abw I-H, Ost, informed SENSEBURG that P.JUL. was an important agent of Jbst HENSEN and had close connections with Gen MILILOVITCH and with circles in France and England. Sdr WREDE supervised P.JUL.'S associates in France.

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7. F.T 129

Personnel: Hptm BUCKWICH (Commanding Officer)
Sdr FUISL (formerly with F.T 128)

History: F.T 129 was activated in Autumn 1943 at ZAGREB, personnel and equipment being taken over from the old list there. Hptm BUCKWICH spoke Serbo-Croat and had a thorough knowledge of the country and people. Source SIESENBURG does not know what happened to F.T 129; when last heard from on 22 Apr 45 it was still operating near ZAGREB.

The Trupp was assigned to Army Group F and later to Army Group E, and attached to the "Deutsche General in Kroatien."

Headquarters were always in ZAGREB. During Autumn and Winter 1944 F.T 129 had a Meldekopf at LJUBLJANA.

Mission: of F.T 129 was to organize an R-Netz in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Its Meldekopf had a similar mission on the Austro-Croat border. No messages were received from agents after the German withdrawal from the area although a good many were recruited and equipped.

8. F.T 167

Personnel: Lt REETZ (Commanding Officer)
Sdr METZNER
Uffz SEIBT
Gefr BOCK (deceased)

History: F.T 167 was activated in BELGRADE, Summer 1944, mainly from inexperienced personnel hired through Front L/Stelle BELGRADE. The Trupp began its F. work in the territory E of the Tisa River, near VELIKI KIKINDA, Yugoslavia. In November 1944 F.T 167, along with 2 Pz Army and F.T 176, left the jurisdiction of U/Bef SV and L/Stelle SV.

Headquarters were first in VELIKI KIKINDA and then in NOVI SAD, Yugoslavia. Later the F.T moved into the region W of Lake Balaton.

Mission: F.T 167 conducted reconnaissance work of dubious value against the Red Army which was advancing from the SE and E into the Banat and the region N of the Drava River.

Uffz SEIBT of Meldekopf TWIC contacted some Rumanians who offered to bring military information concerning the Red Army out of Rumania. Before this connection could be exploited by F.T 167, SEIBT was transferred to KdM WIEN. Nothing further is known of this operation.

9. F.T 168

Personnel: Lt VOGT (Commanding Officer)
Lt HOFMANN

History: F.T 168 was activated in BELGRADE in Summer 1944 and saw action in the Banat in the environs of VRASCI, Yugoslavia, and later on in the vicinity of BROCU, SE of VINKOVCI (Slovenia). It then retreated NW via ZAGREB. The F.T was assigned to the Ic of 2 Pz Army until November 1944, and then worked for the Ic of Army Op E.

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Headquarters were at VRSAO and then at BRZO.

Mission: F.T 168 carried on regular FA reconnaissance work against the Red Army on its own limited sector of the front. It was always in particularly close contact with the fighting troops, a fact appreciated by the local Ia's. It secured information of a purely local tactical nature.

During the campaign in the Banat, Lt HOFMANN was attached to F.T 168 with a motorized advanced Melickopf under his command. This motorized unit was suddenly sent into the VRSAO district of Romania when the Red Army made a surprise attack against the Iron Gate. HOFMANN was able to procure some tactical information but his agents found it difficult to contact him when the Germans began retreating further and further into the West. He was later wounded while attached to F.T 128 in SE Austria.

10. F.T 169

Personnel: O/Lt P.N. (Commanding Officer)
O/Lt MUNTZ

History: F.T 169 was activated in Spring 1944. It served in Albania (Hq in TIRANA) until the German forces departed, working always in close contact with F.T 173. (Both F.Ts were under the command of O/Lt P.N. during the retreat via SCUTARI, SARAJEVO, and ZAGREB.) At the end of February 1945 F.Ts 169 and 173 were transferred to L/Stolle Ost.

The F.T was always attached to Gebirgs Korps XXI under 2 Pz Army and then under Army Gp E.

Mission: The principal duty of F.T 169 was to conduct reconnaissance missions against the Partisans in Albania. O/Lt P.N. knew the country well, his wife being Albanian, and was acquainted with a number of reliable tribesmen who provided him with valuable information.

O/Lt MUNTZ remained in Albania after the German retreat. His motives for staying behind are not known. He was charged in absentia with desertion.

11. F.T 170 (of USFLT MISC CI-IIR No 50, published mid-February 1946)

Personnel: Hptm Gottfried ANDREAS (CO)
Hptm SINZ
Lt FODIASONIG
Sdr VRIASLANDER (killed)
Uffz BOECKMANN
Uffz BROICHMUSSEN
Gefr KJISERLINER (missing)

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History: F.T 170 was activated in September 1943 at ATHENS and operated there until the city was evacuated in Summer 1944. It then functioned in the S.R.JEVO-MOSTAR region of Yugoslavia until early 1945 and then moved into Slovenia.

While in Greece F.T 170 procured some Italian soldiers--among them a captain--for undercover W/T operations in S Italy. They were delivered to L/Stello I SO for training at BREITENBURG, Austria.

12. F.T 171

Personnel: Lt WIENHOLD (CO, September 1943-early 1944)
Lt DUERTRECHTER (CO, early 1944-April 1945)
Lt REICHERT (CO, April 1945-8 May 45)
Lt WASSCHLER
Uffz HOLST
Uffz SCHROEDER

History: F.T 171 was activated in September 1943, personnel and equipment being inherited from Gruppe I of the dissolving 1st S.JONIKI. It was attached to the Ic of Gebirgs Armee Korps XXII, Ritter von LENTHE, and conducted reconnaissance operations against the Partisans in the J.NNIN. region of Greece and maintained a "Waldkopf" on Corfu. Unsuccessful attempts were made to get agents into S Italy. After the retreat from Greece to ZAGREB via S.R.JEVO, it operated near FIUME and subsequently retreated by way of ALGENFURT. Cf USFLT MIS Center CI-IIR No 50, published mid-February 1946.

13. F.T 172

Personnel: O/Lt ARNOLD (CO, succeeded by Lt KRFT, Spring 1944)
Lt HENFTLING
Wachta von SREIK
Fw NEUGELBER

History: F.T 172 was activated in Autumn 1943, the majority of the personnel and equipment coming from the former 1st Z.GREB. Hptm JUNGE or Hptm MANN may have been in command of the F.T during the early days, but source SENSBURG remembers only Lt ARNOLD as being CO. The F.T surrendered to US forces near RUDSTADT, Austria, and was interned at the PWE at WEILHEIM (Upper Bavaria).

F.T 172 was assigned to 2 Pz Army until September 1944, and was then put under the Ic of Army Gp 2, serving from time to time, however, the Ic's of the local mountain corps.

Headquarters of F.T 172 were located for a long time at BIELLO, Yugoslavia, "Waldkopfe" being set up at OGULIN, ZAR., SIBENIC, and GOSPICE.

Mission: The zone of operations covered the Adriatic coast from SEINT up to (but not including) FIUME. F.T 172 achieved local tactical successes in obtaining information on the Partisans. Attempts to recruit agents for work in Allied-occupied Italy were unsuccessful.

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14. F.T. 173

Personnel: Hptm Dr M.T.L. (CO until Summer 1944; succeeded by
O/Lt P.N. and O/Lt von BRITENBERG)
Lt HOFMANN
Uffz KNUDE (missing)

History: F.T. 173 was activated in Autumn 1943 and was at once sent to TIRANA, Albania, remaining there until the Germans retreated at the end of 1944. After withdrawing to ZAGREB via SARAJEVO, the Trupp was transferred to the jurisdiction of L/Stelle I Ost in February 1945.

Headquarters of F.T. 173 were located at TIRANA, and a Meldekopf was maintained at V.LON.

Mission: F.T. 173 procured information on Partisan activities in Albania, but was mainly noted for its success in getting information out of Allied-occupied Italy by means of the agent WERNER (cover name). WERNER, an old and intimate friend of Hptm M.T.L., had been previously trained and employed by 1st BELGRADE. He was dropped by parachute in the vicinity of BRINDISI in the Spring of 1944, supplied with a radio set and enough funds in dollars, pounds, lira, and assorted gold coins to last him half a year. His mission was to trace the movements of Allied units in S Italy and to evaluate the likelihood of an Allied invasion of the Balkans via the Straits of Otranto.

WERNER transmitted reports from Italy until April 1945 and frequently submitted valuable information on Allied locations and strengths. In Summer 1944 additional funds and radio equipment were dropped for him in the vicinity of LECCE, SW of BRINDISI, receipt of which was later acknowledged. When M.T.L. left F.T. 173, contact with WERNER was kept up by Sdr MERTENS of L/Stelle I SO.

SENSEBURG never met WERNER and knows nothing of his background except that he spoke fluent English and Italian.

Another agent was dispatched to Italy by ship, but he was never heard from again. He had no radio transmitter, being expected to return by fishing boat to Albania.

The information on Albania Partisan activities which F.T. 173 collected was generally reliable, and the Gen Kdo in TIRANA acknowledged that several surprise attacks had been thwarted through prior warnings given by the Trupp.

15. F.T. 174

Personnel: Hptm JUNGE (CO, succeeded by O/Lt HEINZ, April 1945)
Sdr Graf ELTZ
Uffz WOLSK/WOLSK (killed)

History: F.T. 174 was activated in Autumn 1943, personnel and equipment being taken over from 1st ZAGREB. After serving in the ZAGREB area until Spring 1945, the F.T. moved to TRILSTE and then retreated N via KLAGENFURT.

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F.T. 174 was assigned to the 1c of 2 Pz Army, Autumn 1943-Autumn 1944. In October 1944 it was assigned to Army Gp E.

Headquarters were at MOSTAR, Croatia, and checkpoints being maintained at PUDGORJAZ and METKOVIC, and probably also at DUBROVNIK and SPLIT. During the retreat from the Balkans the F.T. was stationed at ZENICA, Yugoslavia, and attempted to anticipate Partisan plans regarding the blocking of the all-important highway from SARAJEVO to the North.

Mission: F.T. 174 was mainly concerned with seeking information on Partisan activities on the stretch of coast from the Albanian border to SPLIT (Dalmatia). Although effective in some fields, it was unsuccessful in getting agents into Allied-occupied Italy or the Partisan-held islands of Korcula, Vis, and Miljet.

Hptm JUNGLE maintained contact for some time with an agent in TRIESTE or FIUME until F.T. 176 forbade further relations with the agent (cover name: MOKO) because another GIS agency was already using him.

Uffz WOLLMER/WOLZAK (killed in action) was extremely well-acquainted with conditions in Yugoslavia and gave Ambassador NEUBACHER, Germany's special envoy in the Balkans, much valuable information. NEUBACHER recommended WOLLMER/WOLZAK to the 1c of O/Bef SO for a decoration.

16. F.T. 177

Commanding Officers: Maj STOECKER or O/Lt z S MUELLER (succeeded by Hptm KREISSIGK, September 1944)

History: F.T. 177 was activated by KO Bulgarian in 1944. When the German Army evacuated Bulgaria, F.T. 177 was transferred to Yugoslavia and came under the jurisdiction of O/Bef SO. Being understaffed and ill-equipped, it was reorganized in BELGRADE in September 1944 and placed under the command of Hptm KREISSIGK.

Although it had the actual strength of a F.T., no troops in Yugoslavia were placed under its control. SENSBURG does not know whether F.T. 177 ever operated as a KKO in Bulgaria. It operated in Serbia under the 1c of Bef Serbian in Autumn 1944, was transferred to Army Gp E in October 1944, and then moved to Slovenia, retreating N by way of KL. GEMFURT.

17. F.T. 178

Personnel: Maj STOECKER or O/Lt z S MUELLER, COs (succeeded by Hptm KREISSIGK)
Sdr (Z) BUCHNER

History: F.T. 178 was activated by KO Bulgarian, transferred to the jurisdiction of O/Bef SO when Bulgaria was evacuated, and dissolved late February 1945, its personnel being apportioned among several other F.Ts. SENSBURG is not sure whether KO Bulgarian activated a F.T. 175, but F.T. 178 may originally have borne the designation "175".

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Mission: Source SENSBURG knows nothing of F.T 178's operations in Bulgaria. It later operated against the Partisans in SE Yugoslavia, and then in Slovenia. There was no contact between L/Stelle 180 and F.T 178 after October 1944.

17. F.Ts 117 and 118

Personnel: O/Lt STEIN was CO of one of these Trupps.

History: Both F.Ts were formerly on the E Front and were transferred from L/Stelle I Ost to L/Stelle I SO in September 1944. They joined 2 Pz Army and accompanied this Army when it moved to Hungary at the end of November 1944.

Headquarters of F.T 117 were in BELGRADE in September 1944, and then were moved to share F.T 118's CP near OSIJA, Yugoslavia.

Mission: Both F.Ts worked against the Partisans and Russians in the sector between the Danube and Drava-Rivers and Lake Balaton.

18. F.T 185 Luft

Personnel: O/Lt KILLMUTH (CO)
Maj ERTL (temporary)

History: F.T 185 L was assigned to the Io of Luftwaffenstab Sued Ost. Its special mission was to set up a Luftwaffe R-Netz in the Balkans, absolutely independent of the I R-Netz which had been organized by F.Ts 127 (of USFET MISC CI-IIR No 50, published mid-February 1944), 128, and 129 under L/Stelle I SO. SENSBURG does not believe that F.T 185 L had time to recruit and equip agents before the withdrawal.

Headquarters were at MANOLEVO, Yugoslavia, and, since late September 1944, at ASPLIN, near WILN.

L/Stelle I SO had no connection with F.T 185 L, but O/Lt KILLMUTH frequently came to SENSBURG at BELGRADE in order to get advice and discuss plans.

Maj ERTL had formerly been with 1st BELGRADE and then with F.T 128. In Autumn 1944 he was kidnapped by Rumanians on the Yugoslav-Rumanian border.

19. SENSBURG has no information on F.T 106 or F.T 197 Luft. Neither unit ever operated in the territory of the O/Bef Sued Ost. He believes F.T 106 may have worked in S Hungary.

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ANNEX II

Personnelity List

PRISONER: Obst/Lt SENSEBURG, Walter Albert Lothar, CO of
Leit Stelle I Sued Ost

-
1. ANSTETT (fnu) Obst/Lt born 1896 1.78 m muscular
bald fair complexion blue eyes
Career: Leiter, Ast BERLIN.
 2. BREYLMANN, Julia S.Helf Secy Ihl, Ih, Ast ATHENS, 1941-43
Austrian
lives GRIZ born 1904 1.58 m frail black hair
pale complexion brown eyes
Career: Trfd to Austria 1943.
Misc: Speaks French, Italian.
 3. BECKER (fnu) Major Leiter III of Ast ATHENS, May 41 -
Nov 41
born 1898 1.75 m stocky blond hair ruddy com-
plexion gray eyes
Career: Ast BERLIN.
Misc: Married.
 4. von BOEHN, Wilhelmine S/Helf Secy to Leiter I Ast ATHENS,
1941-43
lives BERLIN born 1908 BERLIN 1.76 m slender
blond hair fair complexion blue eyes
Career: 1940 Ast BRUSSELS. Trfd to Abw unit in
France in 1943.
Misc: Speaks French.
(of CPI Pin: Card 136855)

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US Chief of Counsel

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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758

Consolidated Interrogation Report

BALKAN AFFAIRS

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BALKAN AFFAIRS

1. INTRODUCTION

This consolidated interrogation report is published in answer to: US Forces, European Theater, Special Interrogation Brief, Subject: BALKAN AFFAIRS, For: KAMPHOEVENER, Kurt von; Held at: SAIO; File No: 95, dated: 22 Aug 45; Originated by: Foreign Office, LONDON.

In order to present a more detailed report, Conrad von SCHUBERT of the German Foreign Office (Report Ref No SAIO/PIR/69, dtd 29 Jun 45) and Brig Gen (Croatian Army) Milan von DESSOVIC (Report Ref No SAIO/PIR/15, dtd 23 Jun 45) were also interrogated in connection with this brief.

2. SOURCES

- a. KAMPHOEVENER, Kurt von, German Foreign Office. Source, who is 57 years old, is a cultured diplomat. He claims to have been anti-Nazi, democratic, and an exponent of Anglophile foreign policies. He had been in the diplomatic service since 1911. In 1941 he was head of the commission which fixed the frontiers of the states and provinces carved out of Yugoslavia. In 1943 he worked in the G-2 Section of the Second PANZER Army in VRNJAČKA BANJA, Serbia. During 1944 he was on the Russian front, but in 1945 he was again in Yugoslavia as Liaison Officer of the Foreign Office with Army Group "East" in ZAGREB, Croatia.
- b. SCHUBERT, Conrad von, German Foreign Office. Source is 44 years old. He is a professional diplomat who served in the diplomatic service in various capacities from 1927 until the end of the war. From Jan 43 to May 45 he was Secretary of the German Embassy in ZAGREB, Croatia.
- c. DESSOVIC, Milan von, GENMAJ (Brig Gen), Croatian Military Attache to Germany and Slovakia. Source is a professional soldier who served first in the Austro-Hungarian Army, then in the Yugoslav Army and finally in the Croat Army, which he joined in April. From Aug 41 to Aug 42 he fought on the Eastern front as battalion commander in the Croatian Legion. From Oct 42 to Jan 43 he served in the same capacity in the 1st Brig "PETRILJ", fighting Partisans in Bosnia. In Feb 43 he became Croatian Military Attache to Germany and Slovakia. DESSOVIC is well educated, intelligent, and fairly objective in his judgment. He is opposed to TITO and the pro-war Yugoslav Monarchy, and favors an independent Croatia. Since he considered German influence more beneficial to the cause of Croatian independence than the Allies, he always maintained a friendly attitude toward the Nazi Regime.

Rating: C-2 (all sources)

Interrogator: J.J.H.

3. INTERROGATION RESULTS

a. THE INCLUSION OF MOST OF KOSOVO AND METOBIJA IN ALBANIA IN 1941

KAMPHOEVENER claims that most of Kosovo and Metobija were included in Albania on the basis of a nationality census, i.e., for ethnological reasons. He does not know on how recent a census this was based.

DESSOVIC believed that many Albanians live in the Kosovo-Metobija area and that most of that region might have been given to Albania for that reason, in spite of the fact that the Albanians do not form a majority there and that the area is historically Serb.

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b. THE REASONS FOR DRAWING THE ALBANIAN-BULGARIAN FRONTIER SOUTHEAST OF THE SAR PLANINA MOUNTAINS

According to KAMPHOEVENER, CIANO brought with him to the VIENNA Conference an ethnological map on which frontiers had already been drawn. RIBBENTROP originally agreed to these frontiers, but when German economists convinced him that they greatly favored Italy and placed mineral resources (copper, asbestos and chromium mines) within the Italian sphere of influence, he asked for a revision of the map on the second day of the conference. A compromise was reached which took not only ethnological but also economic factors into consideration. Since the SAR PLANINA mountains are rich in the above mentioned minerals, the final location of the frontier line must have been the result of this compromise. Ethnological considerations favored Albania and thereby Italy, whereas economic considerations favored Bulgaria, which promised to produce for Germany.

DESSOVIC thinks that strategic considerations were mainly responsible for the drawing of the Albania-Bulgaria frontier southeast of the SAR PLANINA.

c. RELATIONS BETWEEN NEDIC AND MIHAILOVICH

KAMPHOEVENER and DESSOVIC believed that there existed a certain solidarity between NEDIC and MIHAILOVICH because they had been fellow-officers in the old Serbian Army. Both were, in addition, anti-communist and loyal to the King.

In KAMPHOEVENER's opinion, MIHAILOVICH always avoided personal contact with both NEDIC and the German authorities, and never openly acknowledged any cooperation with them. Initially, there was probably no cooperation whatsoever, and MIHAILOVICH even termed NEDIC a "traitor". But later, when MIHAILOVICH adopted NEDIC's stand against Communism, agreements were made between local Chetnik representatives and NEDIC, as well as with the German authorities. The latter frequently included "gentlemen's agreements" whereby Chetniks were allowed by the Germans to operate unmolested in certain areas, and were permitted to "loot" German supply trains. It must be assumed that MIHAILOVICH, who liked to stay in the background, had knowledge of, and agreed to, these arrangements.

Shortly before the capitulation of Germany, representatives of NEDIC, MIHAILOVICH, the Slovene Kingdom Party and the Croat Peasant Party met in LJUBLJANA and ZAGREB to form a united front against Communism. KAMPHOEVENER has no knowledge of the final outcome of these meetings but he knows that they were held with the tacit approval of the German authorities. At that time, both NEDIC and MIHAILOVICH were hoping that the Western Allies would take over control of former Yugoslavia, and both claimed that they had established contact with the Western Allies. TITO and Communism were their common enemies.

DESSOVIC summed up the situation as follows: NEDIC wanted peace in Serbia; since Chetnik activities created unrest, he first objected to MIHAILOVICH's movement. Later, due to an understanding or for other reasons, MIHAILOVICH confined his operations mainly to the "Croatian Area", and differences between NEDIC and MIHAILOVICH became very small. DESSOVIC believes that NEDIC and MIHAILOVICH maintained contact with each other. He knows that Chetniks and German authorities worked together as early as Oct 42. Exchanges of prisoners went on continually.

d. AGREEMENT BETWEEN COL SIMIC, CAPT KALABIC, AND RITTMESTER (CAPT) FUERST WREDE

KAMPHOEVENER cannot clearly place SIMIC and KALABIC in his memory. But he vaguely associates their names with a contact made locally between a

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German ABWEHR officer and the Chetniks early in 1944, which resulted in an armistice covering Old Serbia and the Sandjak. This agreement was reported to the G-2 of the German Second PANZER Army. Although it was welcomed by the German Army in general, the ABWEHR agent risked being court-martialed because the BELGRADE Army Administration did not entirely approve of his action. WREDE, who was the political advisor to the German Military Administration in BELGRADE, might unofficially have approved of the step the ABWEHR officer had taken because, contrary to the BELGRADE Military Administration, he preferred cooperation with the CHETTINKS to that with NEDIC. The above agreement was later extended. SIMIC and KALABIC might have taken part in the first conference.

DESSOVIC has no knowledge of an agreement between WREDE and SIMIC and KALABIC. He only knows that NEUBACHER, German Ambassador to BELGRADE, and the SD had been interested in cooperation with the CHETTINKS.

e. EVENTS OF AUG 44 WHICH LED TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF VOKIC, MINISTER OF WAR, CANIC, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, AND LORKOVIC, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

KAMPHOEVENER was in Russia at the time, thus he could only repeat what he later heard about those events. After BADOGLIO's surrender, VOKIC, CANIC and LORKOVIC had become "unreliable" from the German point of view. They probably thought that Germany's defeat was imminent and either got in touch with the Western Allies or took advantage of the situation to make demands on the German authorities.

SCHUBERT states that LORKOVIC allegedly dealt with the British behind the backs of PAVELIC, Croat Chief of State, and the German authorities. PAVELIC discovered those dealings and, asserting that he had written evidence to prove the matter, reported it to the German Embassy in ZAGREB. Source does not know if KASCHKE, the German Ambassador, ever saw this evidence. VOKIC and CANIC were supposedly also involved in the plot. LORKOVIC and VOKIC were then imprisoned (an exceptionally mild sentence for treason), while CANIC was only forced to resign. Since Ambassador KASCHKE had always thought very highly of LORKOVIC, the latter's arrest came as a surprise.

SCHUBERT also mentioned the theory that the alleged plot was PAVELIC's invention in order to rid himself of LORKOVIC who belonged to a different faction of the USTASHA. Rivalry and factionalism within the USTASHA was also mentioned by DESSOVIC as a possible explanation. According to him, LORKOVIC together with Dr KOSAK belonged to the "European USTASHA" faction, whereas PAVELIC sided with the "Wild USTASHA" represented by MOSCOW, HEREN-CIO and LISAK.

DESSOVIC summed up the "official Croatian version" as follows: LORKOVIC started negotiations with the Western Allies without the knowledge of PAVELIC; VOKIC, supported by CANIC, who was a member of the Croat army and not the USTASHA, wanted to dissolve the armed USTASHA forces. This plot was discovered by PAVELIC.

DESSOVIC believes that in view of the precarious military situation, both PAVELIC and LORKOVIC, who were anxious to appear in a better light to the Western Allies, decided to get in touch with them. LORKOVIC probably started negotiations on direct orders from PAVELIC rather than behind his back. VOKIC possibly wanted to procure German arms in order to cooperate with the Allies against the Germans if and when the time came. However, it is improbable that he wanted to dissolve the armed USTASHA.

It is also possible that the Germans discovered the plot or else PAVELIC might have been afraid that the Germans would find out and consequently "exploded the shell" himself, without revealing his part in the plot. CANIC, who was apparently not involved, was only forced to resign.

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f. THE CROAT PEASANT PARTY, ITS PRESENT STRENGTH AND FUTURE SOLIDARITY;
DR MACEK'S PRESTIGE

KAMPHOEVENER believes that about 50% of Croatia's population is behind the Croat Peasant Party. At the time of Germany's capitulation the Peasant Party was the only party which could have taken over the fate of Croatia.

Croats have been accustomed to belong to the opposition; Dr MACEK has been their leader for about 20 years. He had always been in opposition to BELGRADE, never coming to a final agreement, and he kept his part as the spiritual leader of the opposition throughout the PAVELIC Regime. Yet, in KAMPHOEVENER's opinion, it is highly improbable that he would prove a constructive politician, considering his advanced age and poor physical condition.

MACEK's name, however, still carries great weight in democratic and liberal quarters in Croatia, and his prestige is high throughout the country. He is respected as a person who maintained high, uncompromising integrity during the occupation regime. Given an opportunity, he could either stay as the leader of his Party or if he decided to appoint a successor, his choice would, in KAMPHOEVENER's opinion, be accepted by his followers.

Dr MACEK is in favor of an autonomous Croatia within a Yugoslav kingdom. KAMPHOEVENER believes that the Croats, having just learned from the bitter experience of their first opportunity to govern themselves, would support MACEK.

SCHUBERT states that since the Croat Peasant Party was officially dissolved it is difficult to estimate its strength, but he believes that if free elections were held about 80% of the population of Croatia would vote for the Croat Peasant Party "in spite of TITO".

Dr MACEK is still the most popular political figure in Croatia. He has always been, and still is, the "idol" of the little man. This explains the continued lack of harmony and cooperation between the Croat peasants and the USTASHA.

MACEK however is an old man and it is questionable if he could resume Party leadership.

Most members of the Croat Peasant Party, including MACEK, prefer an independent Croat State (on this question source differs with KAMPHOEVENER). Yet, SCHUBERT too believes that if an attempt were made to create another Yugoslavia, MACEK and his Party would be willing to have Croatia join it as an autonomous state within the Federation.

DESSOVIC claims that the Croat Peasant Party received 90% of all votes in Croatia in the last free elections. Even though it might have lost some supporters in the meantime, its present strength is probably still close to that figure.

The Party enjoys a great inner solidarity because its members are bound together by common interests. It is the only Party in Croatia which had definite accomplishments and successes to its credit.

MACEK used to be very popular, but according to DESSOVIC, everybody who goes into exile loses his popularity, and MACEK was not able to escape that fate either. Yet, DESSOVIC believes that possibly under the leadership of KOSUTIC or KRNEVIC the Croat Peasant Party could once again play an important part "if it were allowed to exist and function freely."

g. COMMUNISTS IN CROATIA

KAMPHOEVENER considers the Communists in Croatia only a minority

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(about 20% of the population). Communism is the slogan of people dissatisfied with the conditions which prevailed during the past years, and its mainstay is the "Intelligentsia". The latter are idealists with abstract theories, which would be almost impossible to apply because of the proud, individualistic, patriarchal tradition of the peasantry. Even though the simple people admire and respect "men of learning" they would most violently resist the establishment of a new social system affecting their way of life. KAMPHOEVENER thinks that under free political conditions most of the present communist youth can be won over to Western, democratic ideas.

SCHUBERT believes that only about 20-30% of TITO's Partisans are "real" Communists. Many, including quite a number of former members of the Great Peasant Party, joined TITO because they were dissatisfied with the USTASHA and the Nazi Regime and not because they were convinced Communists. Others, mainly of the rank and file, were forced into the movement. However, TITO will keep his support if he refrains from introducing "MOSCOW Communism" and uses his own initiative instead. In that case, his popularity might spread among people who hitherto have not been among his supporters. He considers TITO's movement the only really significant representative of Croatian Communism.

DESSOVIC states: "Unfortunately, due to the immense successes of TITO's Partisans, those people (the Communists) are much stronger than is desirable!" He supports SCHUBERT's view that many joined TITO for nationalist rather than communist reasons.

Prior to TITO, only the workers in the chemical and wood (lumbering) industry had been Communists.

He believes that for a long time to come there will be no opposition to TITO because, "it is physically impossible to attempt any opposition."

h. CROAT ATTITUDE TOWARD A YUGOSLAV FEDERATION

KAMPHOEVENER thinks that the experiment Croatia underwent under PAVLIC was sufficient to cure them of the idea of ever forming an independent state of their own again. Yet, antagonism between her and Serbia, based on cultural and historic grounds, has widened to a deep gulf due to the shocking atrocities committed by both sides, particularly by the Croat USTASHA. This will make existence under one government very difficult. Nevertheless the Croat Peasant Party and the majority of Croats would welcome an autonomous Croatia within a Federal Yugoslav State. They would also gladly form part of a Central European Federation. On the other hand, the Croats are unwilling to submit ever again to the domination of BELGRADE.

DESSOVIC claims that prior to the European War there was a period of better understanding between Serbs and Croats, and that at that time there existed a possibility for Croatia to live, with a "reasonable" degree of autonomy, as a peaceful member of the Yugoslav State. Later, however, the Serbs again started to insist on their "hegemony"; relations became strained and, with the beginning of the war, the differences of opinion became crystallized: Serbs were anti-German, while the Croats, out of expediency, became pro-German. This also conformed to old historic differences in outlook: Serbs always liked to think of Russia as "Mother Russia", whereas Croats have looked to the West (meaning mainly Austria and later Germany) for inspiration.

Due to the shortcomings of the USTASHA, enthusiasm for an independent Croatia has dwindled, and a strong Croat autonomy within a Yugoslav Federation might be acceptable to most Croats.

i. ARCHBISHOP STEPINAC: HIS RELATIONS WITH THE GERMANS

KAMPHOEVENER has never met Archbishop STEPINAC personally. Source only knows that the Church in general cooperated with the Italians and Germans.

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SCHUBERT gives the following picture of STEPINAC whom he knew very well. "STEPINAC reminded me of a Catholic fanatic of the Middle Ages. He is perhaps not mentally outstanding but he is extremely energetic. A Croat Nationalist, through and through. He is strongly anti-Serb and, even though he was ideologically opposed to National Socialism and the USTASHA, he collaborated with both to further his nationalistic aims and to fight TITO and Bolshevism."

He was very active politically and even though he chose to stay out of the limelight, his connections to the Vatican and Switzerland were known and utilized by others. He maintained contact with the Pope, and through representatives or intermediaries even conferred with Archbishop SPELLMAN while the latter was in Rome. It was once rumored that the Pope requested STEPINAC to stay out of active politics since the Vatican wished to maintain its neutrality.

DESSOVIC does not know Archbishop STEPINAC personally but he thinks that in his youth STEPINAC was a Yugoslav ideologist (SCHUBERT and DESSOVIC disagree on this point). For that reason, he doubts that STEPINAC was friendly toward the Germans. Similarly, in the beginning STEPINAC was against the USTASHA but, after the latter had given him certain assurances, they started to collaborate for an independent Croatia. He agrees that STEPINAC maintained connections with the Vatican.

j. CROAT REACTIONS TO PANSLAVISM

All sources agree that only very few Croats are in favor of Pan Slavism. Of Catholic faith, and for a long time under Western influence, Croats in general are indifferent towards the Pan Slav movement. It might be significant in this respect that the USTASHA started a new "theory" according to which the Croats are really remnants of the former Visigoths, with some Dinaric blood added later, and that therefore their Slavic language is but an historic accident.

k. SENTIMENTS OF THE POPULATION OF ISTRIA

KAMPHOEVENER and DESSOVIC agree that the great majority of the population of the Istrian peninsula is Slovene. Italians are in the majority along the coast, with some Germans (Austrians) in the larger towns. He does not know about the prevailing national sentiments.

SCHUBERT only knows that the Croats were disappointed in not receiving TRIESTE and FIUME in 1941, and that they maintained their claims to these territories. USTASHA policy was directed at gaining, at least, political concessions in Istria. He claims - in contrast to DESSOVIC and KAMPHOEVENER - that Croats are by far in the majority in Istria. He believes that not many Slovenes live on the Peninsula. Those that do are concentrated in the CILLY - MARBURG - LAIBACH - KLAGENFURT area.

4. CONCLUSIONS

None

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None

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ANNEX VI

FAT 380

PRISONER: O/Lt Dr PANDEF, Rudolf

PANDEF cannot give full details of FAT 380 since he spent most of his two months in CIRKVENICA on trips to HQ or on leave. Members of Amt III were forbidden to participate in any FAT action, to avoid their capture by the enemy.

FAT 380 consisted of approximately 24 men, stationed at three bases of operations. One base was located at SEBENIK under Sef (Z) Dr BECKELMANN, another at SPLIT under Uffz Hans KAUFMANN. The third base, which also served as HQ of the FAT, was in CIRKVENICA under O/Lt PANDEF. The sector of operations of FAT 380 extended along the Dalmatian coast from CIRKVENICA to the area S of SPLIT, but was not clearly defined.

From CIRKVENICA the unit took part in raids of the divisions holding that area in order to exploit documents or interrogate prisoners of interest to Amt III. In March 1944, the FAT was present during the occupation of RAB but obtained no information, as the Partisans had escaped in time. At the end of May 1944 FAT 380 took part in raids on the islands of Ulib, Silba, Tseruda, Ist, and Molat (or Vir). PANDEF had learned that Ulib was an important link in the Partisan courier chain and supply net which passed through DUGI, OTULI, and RAB. Valuable documents were captured at Ulib, and it was learned that the British Army had several agents, probably Yugoslavs, and a W/T station there. At the end of July 1944 FAT 380 participated in a raid on PAC, but results were poor. In October 1944 the FAT took part in action in the DERNICE-LOKCE area, but PANDEF does not know what the results were.

He does not know the activities of the bases in SEBENIK and SPLIT since news by courier required several months to reach him, and only very scanty accounts were transmitted by radio.